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General introduction 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parts of this Chapter are based on:  
Nievelstein, F., Van Gog, T., & Prins, F. J. (2008). Instructional models in domains and professions -
Learning law: The problems with ontology and reasoning. In J. M. Spector, M. D. Merrill, J. J. G. Van 
Merriënboer, & M. P. Driscoll (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Educational Communications and Technology 
(3rd rev. ed., pp. 552-556). Hillsdale, New York: Erlbaum  
Nievelstein, F., Van Gog, T., Van Dijck, G., Spoormans, H., & Boshuizen, H. P. A. (2009). Expertise develop-
ment in law: How instruction can be supported. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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“Anthony, a 46-year old Dutchman, told his 32-year old Dutch fiancée Beatrice the 
day before their wedding that, in the past, he was married to another woman in the 
United States. After a few years they decided not to live together anymore, but the 
marriage has never been officially dissolved. Despite this statement, Beatrice mar-
ried Anthony. Their marriage was performed in Amsterdam and two children were 
born. After three years of marriage, Anthony wants to end the marriage.” “Can 
Anthony apply for dissolution of the marriage? If the marriage can be dissoluted, what is the 
children’s status? What happens with the acquired goods, supposed that there were no mar-
riage conditions?” 
 This case is an example of a true to life case of the kind often used in both Civil 
law (European-Continental) and Common law (Anglo-Saxon) education. Students 
need to find ‘objectively correct’ answers to the questions by considering different 
legal aspects and exploring every conceivable (counter) argument. Teaching stu-
dents to solve such cases, is the main goal of legal education (Blasi, 1995; Vranken, 
2006; Williams, 1992). Students are mainly taught to reason about cases through 
‘learning by doing’; that is, they are believed to learn to solve legal cases best by 
engaging in solving many cases (Marchant, Robinson, Anderson, & Schadewald, 
1993; Williams, 1992). This instructional approach (‘learning by doing’) is embedded 
in different educational formats, such as formal lectures, tutorials, moot or trial 
courts, self-study assignments, electronic case-solving programmes, or collaborative 
learning assignments. These educational formats appear in almost all law schools to 
some extent, but the preferred or dominant educational format tends to differ 
somewhat between law schools in the Civil and Common law systems as well as 
between law schools within one system (Teich, 1986). 
 In both legal systems, problems have been noted regarding the quality of law 
students’ reasoning (Sullivan, Colby, Welch-Wegner, Bond, & Shulman, 2007; 
Vranken, 2006). These problems seem to arise from the complexity of the domain, 
the way in which knowledge is acquired in complex domains, and the instructional 
approach of ‘learning by doing’ widely used in law schools. 
Common and civil law 
The Common law and the Civil law systems differ in several respects regarding 
reasoning about cases. In the Common law (Anglo-Saxon) system, legal profession-
als such as solicitors, judges, public prosecutors, and legal advisors solve cases 
mainly by drawing analogies to past cases and court judgments, and rely to a lesser 
extent on documented laws and doctrines (Ashley & Aleven, 1991; Dop, 2003). This 
type of reasoning is called case-based reasoning (Vandevelde, 1996). It is a cyclic and 
integrated process of solving problems, learning from this experience, and solving 
similar problems by analogy (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994). In this system, the rule of stare 
decisis binds lower courts to base their judgments by analogy on decisions made by 
the highest courts of law (Marchant et al.,1993; Vranken, 2006). Legislation will only 
be used to complete and/or to correct the Common law but will not precede it (Dop, 
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2003). To pose convincing and powerful arguments on new cases, lawyers need to 
compare them with precedents that have similar relevant features and resulted in 
court judgments that would also be favourable for their client, and emphasize dif-
ferences with precedents that might seem similar but resulted in unfavourable court 
judgments (Vandevelde, 1996). The underlying legal framework that should be 
inferred from the similarities and dissimilarities between cases may at first glance 
seem simple but can grow increasingly complex due to contextual characteristics 
(Marchant et al., 1993; Vranken 2006) and the differing interests of the different 
parties involved (Stratman, 2002). 
 In the Continental (Civil law) system, jurisdiction is based more on the applica-
tion of codified rules and doctrines than on comparisons with prior cases (Dop, 
2003). Legal problems are analyzed in light of generally accepted rules from which a 
solution can be deduced (Stratman, 2004), and this type of reasoning can therefore 
be called rule-based reasoning (Vandevelde, 1996). Codification in Civil law goes back 
thousands of years when most rules were abstracted from judicial decisions of con-
crete cases (Vranken, 2006). Making use of codification in reasoning about cases 
guarantees the predictability and unity of jurisdiction (Dop, 2003). However, when 
codes or statutes cannot give an unambiguous answer or when new cases contain 
similar relevant features as previous cases that had strong favourable court judg-
ments, judges may base their decision on past court judgments (Vandevelde, 1996). 
Furthermore, the interpretation of codes and statutes can change depending on the 
changing views on rationality and righteousness (e.g., twenty years ago, someone 
would be prosecuted for making a certain statement in public, whereas nowadays, 
this would not be the case, or vice versa). 
 Despite those differences, reasoning about cases is one of the core activities for 
professionals in both the Common and Civil law systems (Lundeberg, 1987; Strat-
man, 2002), and therefore, it is also a core activity for law students in preparation for 
legal practice. 
Law education 
As a result of the differences between case-based and rule-based reasoning, educa-
tional formats differ somewhat between the law systems. For example, in Common 
law, the Socratic case-dialogue method is the most applied format (Sullivan, et al., 
2007; Teich, 1986). Other formats such as formal lectures, tutorials, moot or trial 
courts (i.e., the adversary method), self-study assignments, electronic case-solving 
programmes, collaborative learning assignments, and the problem method in which 
students have to read cases, texts of law, and other law-related resources in prepara-
tion to answer problems of standard law school examinations, are also used in 
Common law, but to a lesser extent than in Civil law (Sullivan, et al., 2007; Teich, 
1986). Although most Civil law schools use many of those techniques at least once 
in the curriculum, they usually have a certain preferred or dominant technique (e.g., 
some have more emphasis on lectures, some on self-study, some on collaborative 
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learning). As mentioned before, regardless of the educational format used in law 
schools, learning to reason about cases relies predominantly on doing just that (i.e., 
‘learning by doing’) and as a result students usually have to reason about lots and 
lots of cases using the information sources that professionals also have available 
(Blasi, 1995; Sullivan et al., 2007; Vandevelde, 1996; Vranken, 2006). 
 Several authors have pointed out some general problems with legal education, 
noting that graduates often experience difficulties when they enter the profession, 
as a result of fragmentation of knowledge necessary to reason about cases (Sullivan 
et al., 2007; Vranken, 2006)1. When students enter the profession by apprenticeship, 
for example, their academic knowledge does not completely correspond with the 
necessary professional knowledge. Sullivan et al. and Vranken state that students 
are educated to compare and contrast cases and/or to apply rules and principles to 
legal problems in a systematic way, time and time again, but without enough focus 
on integrating different kinds of knowledge (e.g., knowledge of previous court 
judgments, laws, ethical aspects, political aspects, religious aspects, changes in soci-
ety, et cetera). Without such integration, transfer of acquired reasoning skills to real-
world cases that require a different approach, will be hampered. 
 However, it is not just when transitioning from law school to the profession that 
problems with reasoning skills become apparent. Also in the acquisition of this 
complex skill students seem to experience serious difficulties. From an interview 
study we conducted with Dutch law students and law faculty members specialized 
in private law, a picture emerges of the most important problems and causes. We 
asked 24 first-year (novice) students and 24 third-year (advanced) students to tell us 
whether they experienced difficulties with learning to reason about cases and if so, 
to elaborate on those. In addition, we asked 12 law faculty members to elaborate on 
the kind of difficulties they think their students experience when learning to reason 
about cases. The results were as follows: 87% of the first-year students indicated to 
experience difficulties due to the fact that they do not understand the exact meaning 
of concepts related to a case, 30% indicated to experience difficulties with using 
external information sources such as codes, 22% mentioned that it is difficult to take 
into account the different perspectives that can be taken on a case, and 13% said that 
it is difficult to make connections between different aspects of a case. Remarkably, 
the third-year students mentioned similar difficulties, along with some additional 
problems: 94% indicated to experience difficulties because they do not understand 
the exact meaning of concepts related to a case, 89% said to experience difficulties 
with using external sources, 61% mentioned that it is difficult to draw connections 
between different aspects of a case. Furthermore, 28% mentioned that they lack the 
necessary legal knowledge to understand the judicial implication of the case, and 
11% mentioned that they have difficulties with interpreting court judgments and 
exceptions on rules. It is quite striking that the problems experienced seem to in-
                                                             
1 Law education is not unique in this respect; for a general discussion of the problems of fragmentation in 
education, see Van Merriënboer and Kirschner (2007) and for a discussion of the problems that the transi-
tion from school to work can bring along in a variety of domains, see Boshuizen, Bromme, and Gruber 
(2004). 
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crease rather than decrease when students progress through law school. The faculty 
members’ responses were in almost complete agreement with the students’ an-
swers. They unanimously mentioned that, in their experience, students have diffi-
culties with learning to reason about cases because they do not understand the cor-
rect formal meaning of concepts, have problems with understanding information 
from external sources, and with taking different legal perspectives on a case. 
Characteristics of the legal domain that make learning law difficult 
Conceptual knowledge and ontology 
The first requirement to be able to understand and reason about cases is a correct 
understanding of legal concepts (Sullivan et al., 2007). Conceptual knowledge is 
necessary to abstract the relevant legal information from contextualized problems 
and from external sources (Lundeberg, 1987; Sullivan et al., 2007). Students, espe-
cially novices, lack knowledge of the formal legal language (Blasi, 1995; Deegan, 
1995; Lindahl, 2004). Acquiring correct conceptual knowledge is, however, very 
difficult for two reasons. A first difficulty is that learning the ‘official’ legal language 
requires conceptual restructuring since many concepts that are routinely used in 
everyday language often have a specific formal meaning in law (Deegan, 1995; Lin-
dahl, 2004; Lundeberg, 1987; Stratman, 2002; for a description of similar problems in 
the domain of science, see e.g., Chi, 2005; Chi & Roscoe, 2002). The moment students 
enter law school, their naïve conceptual knowledge should first be replaced by the 
formal, judicial meaning of the same concepts. A second difficulty is that various 
concepts (called intermediate concepts; Ashley & Aleven, 1991; Lindahl, 2003, 2004) 
do not have one single, fixed meaning; instead, the function of these concepts varies 
depending on the context (Ashley & Aleven, 1991; Lindahl, 2003, 2004; Vervoordel-
donk, 2006; Vranken 2006). The concept written agreement, for example, can refer to 
the tangible object itself (i.e., a paper contract) or it can refer to the specified agreed 
upon rights and duties. In this example, the context is important to interpret the 
meaning of the concept literally. In the following example on ownership, the context 
is important to understand the structural meaning of the concept, and the legal 
implications of the concept may change drastically depending on context. Ownership 
has different implications in terms of rights and duties depending on the kind of 
object that is owned. For instance, ownership with regard to pets implies other 
rights and duties than ownership with regard to immovable property. As these 
examples show, the exact implications of intermediate concepts can only be under-
stood in the light of contextual circumstances (Ashley & Aleven, 1991; Lindahl, 
2003; Vranken, 2006). 
 Related to the acquisition of correct conceptual knowledge, is the need to learn 
the domain’s ontology. The term ontology in its philosophical definition, refers to the 
conceptual knowledge regarding basic categories of existence in life such as plants, 
animals and objects, and implies knowledge about the features and underlying 
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principles of those basic categories (see e.g., Kelly & Keil, 1985). Nowadays, the term 
ontology is often used in the domain of artificial intelligence to refer to a formalized 
conceptual vocabulary that can be seen as a shared and agreed upon, explicit repre-
sentation of a domain (Bench-Capon & Visser, 1997; Chi & Roscoe, 2002; Visser & 
Bench-Capon, 1998). Ontological knowledge is conceptual knowledge that corre-
sponds to the underlying structure or organization of the domain, and hence, cor-
rect conceptual knowledge should be acquired before a domain’s ontology can be 
mastered (see e.g., Chi & Roscoe, 2002). 
 Research on development of conceptual knowledge and ontology in law sup-
ports the statements of Sullivan and colleagues (2007), who not only argued that 
formal legal knowledge is the first important prerequisite for legal analysis like 
understanding and categorizing legal problems, but also noted -in line with the 
interview data we presented- that acquiring the formal legal knowledge is a difficult 
process. Krieger (2006) demonstrated that novice law school students relied on their 
lay experiences and commonsense explanations when they had to argue on a case 
on consumer fraud. Advanced students in his study relied more on formal legal 
language and were able to identify rules of law when they had to argue on the same 
case, but they had difficulties applying these rules in drawing inferences. According 
to Sullivan et al., correct formal knowledge will often be fully grasped only after 
students have gained experience with various aspects of legal practice. 
 However, lack of conceptual knowledge is not only a major problem when solv-
ing cases; lack of shared conceptual knowledge between students, as well as between 
students and experts, might also have consequences for communication and col-
laboration, as a shared and agreed upon representation is important for mutual 
understanding (cf. Bromme, Rambow, & Nückles, 2001). Even when professional 
roles are not defined by cooperation and a common goal but by dispute and con-
flict, as in the legal domain, professionals need to share the same ontology to be able 
to anticipate and react on others’ arguments (Ashley & Aleven, 1991). 
External information sources 
Legal professionals rely heavily on external information sources, such as law books 
and databases to look up rules, annotations, or court judgments, while reasoning 
about cases. These external sources can be seen as large collective memory sources 
(Säljö, 1996) that have to be used to guarantee equality, generalization, repeatability, 
and predictability of argumentation and judgments (Dop, 2003; Vranken, 2006). 
Without referring to generally accepted legal sources, it is impossible to judge simi-
lar cases equally in distinctive situations and in distinctive courts. For students, 
however, using these sources can be a daunting task for two reasons. First, search-
ing through these often extensive sources of documentation to find suitable infor-
mation to apply to a case is difficult when knowledge of the organization of the 
sources has not been mastered. For example, knowing that the Dutch civil code is 
divided into one part related to ‘persons’ and one part related to ‘objects’ and that 
the ‘object’ part is divided in ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ rights, and furthermore, that 
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the code is composed of general to particular provisions (Vervoordeldonk, 2006) is 
necessary to search effectively. Without knowledge of the organization of external 
sources, search will be relatively arbitrary and time consuming. Secondly, correct 
conceptual and ontological knowledge is also necessary to interpret the information 
found in the source and to apply it to the case (Sullivan et al., 2007). 
Adversarial reasoning 
Depending on the professional role one holds, the interest in a case is often quite 
different (Ashley & Aleven, 1991; Stratman, 2002; Thagard, 1992). For example, an 
attorney’s interest is to create the most optimal perspectives for his or her client, 
whereas a public prosecutor seeks to bring someone to justice. As a consequence, 
they will likely focus on other aspects of the case, but this can only be successful if 
they can take into account -and can anticipate on- the (counter) arguments posed by 
the other party that has different perspectives and interests. This type of perspective 
taking, that is, taking into account the possible actions of the opponent to place 
yourself in the most optimal position, can be compared with playing chess. The goal 
of chess players is to choose the best possible move on the chessboard, but each 
option will elicit different potential future moves of the opponent that need to be 
considered to determine what the best move is (Gobet & Charness, 2006). After 
every move, ‘all’ possible future moves should be evaluated again, because after 
every move the consequences might change. In the legal domain, thinking through 
possible actions and being prepared for reactions is important to pose convincing 
arguments without leaving room for others to rebut those arguments (Thagard, 
1992; Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1984). 
 To teach students adversary reasoning skills, they are often assigned to one 
specific role when they have to reason about a case (e.g., judge, lawyer plaintiff, 
lawyer defendant). Reading research has shown that specific role assignment 
strengthens someone’s identification with that role (cf. Anderson, Pichert, & Shirey, 
1983; Goetz, Schallert, Reynolds, & Radin, 1983). For legal cases this could mean that 
role assignment could strengthen identification with the interests that have to be 
protected to solve the case as favourable as possible. One necessary aspect of role 
taking in adversarial reasoning is that a student should be able to take different per-
spectives to be able to take possible (counter) arguments of the opposition into ac-
count. However, if a role is assigned, it might be difficult to take a different perspec-
tive because of a highly focused view on specific case aspects (cf. Anderson et al., 
1983). Stratman (2002) investigated whether assigned roles (i.e., an advocatory role, 
an advisory role, a policy role, and a class recitation role) influenced the way in 
which law students detected and interpreted case information when they worked 
on the assignment to write an argument in favour of a particular interest. Results 
showed that students who were assigned to the advocatory role performed better 
on detecting the underlying legal frameworks of several cases and posed more per-
suasive arguments than the students assigned to other roles. Stratman hypothesized 
that students assigned to the advocatory role were better able to identify themselves 
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with the specific assignment, in such a way that they really felt they had to protect 
someone’s interests and, therefore, focused more on aspects of the case that were 
relevant for doing so, compared to students assigned to other roles. 
 In sum, these characteristics of the domain make legal reasoning a complex skill 
to acquire. In the next section expertise development in complex domains in general 
will be described, followed by a more specific look at expertise development in the 
legal domain. 
Expertise acquisition in complex domains 
Developing expertise can be seen as the acquisition, elaboration, and/or reorganiza-
tion of cognitive schemas (Boshuizen, 2004; Ericsson, 2006; Sweller, 1988). When 
novices enter a new domain, their knowledge is limited and fragmented (i.e., not yet 
organized), and the schemas they have are rather superficial, consisting of few con-
cepts with few relations between them (Alexander, 2003; Boshuizen & Schmidt, 
1992; Van de Wiel, Boshuizen, & Schmidt, 2000). Knowledge becomes better inte-
grated the more often concepts are linked with each other and the more often they 
are activated together in memory (Boshuizen, 2004). Schemas have two important 
functions in the process of learning and problem solving (see e.g., Boshuizen & 
Schmidt, 1992, 2008; Sweller, 1988). Next to storage and organization of knowledge 
in long term memory, schemas also facilitate information processing in working 
memory during problem solving and learning. When learning new skills, the num-
ber of new information elements that can be simultaneously processed in working 
memory is limited (Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956). Tasks that contain a high number of 
new, inter-related information elements therefore impose a high cognitive load on 
working memory, and for complex tasks this number is usually very high (Sweller, 
Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). Available schemas can reduce this load, because 
they integrate several information elements into one (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008; 
Dufresne, Gerace, Thibodeau-Hardiman, & Mestre 1992; Sweller, 1988). However, it 
is not just the number of information elements that determines task complexity. The 
degree of structuredness of the task also plays an important role. Complex cognitive 
tasks require the coordination and integration of multiple, inter-related constituent 
skills. These constituent skills can be either recurrent (or routine) or non-recurrent 
(or non-routine; Van Merriënboer & Kirschner, 2007). Recurrent constituent skills 
rely on algorithmic, rule-based behaviour after training. They are associated with 
routine task aspects that typically have a narrow problem space, and the correct 
application of a particular set of operators associated with a problem type always 
leads to a correct solution. In these situations, problem solving performance can be 
automated as a result of a lot of practice, because appropriate problem solving op-
erators can relatively easily be recognized and distinguished from inappropriate 
ones. Non-recurrent constituent skills on the other hand, are associated with non-
routine task aspects, meaning they have to be performed in varying ways across 
problem situations, and therefore one needs a strategy to narrow the search space 
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and select those operators that are most likely to lead to a solution (e.g., heuristics). 
However, experts can still perform non-recurrent task aspects far more effectively 
and efficiently than non-experts, as a result of their experience with many different 
cases (see e.g., Boshuizen, 2004; Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992, 2008). 
Expertise acquisition in law 
Reasoning about legal cases is a complex, ill-structured cognitive task (see also e.g., 
Blasi, 1995) because it requires the coordination and integration of different kinds of 
knowledge and skills. With regard to the case this Chapter started with, different 
kinds of knowledge and skills need to be coordinated and integrated to formulate 
answers to the questions and leaving no space for others to rebut: knowledge of the 
correct formal meaning of concepts and terminology (e.g., dissolution, marriage), 
knowledge of rules and principles (e.g., community of property), being able to rec-
ognize structural similarities between current and prior cases that are likely to differ 
on surface features, the ability to find -and understand- appropriate precedents or 
legislation based on these relevant features (e.g., judgments of the Supreme Court), 
knowledge about what is ‘reasonable’ in accordance with the current norm of ra-
tionality and righteousness, the ability to pose counterexamples and take into ac-
count possible counterarguments by other parties (e.g., lawyer of Anthony, lawyer 
of Beatrice), et cetera2. Because of the high number of information elements that 
have to be integrated and coordinated, reasoning about cases will impose a high 
load on working memory, especially for novice students who lack cognitive sche-
mas to reduce this load and guide their reasoning process. As a result of a lack of 
conceptual knowledge and knowledge of specific problem solving strategies, com-
plex cognitive tasks such as reasoning about legal cases require novice students to 
rely on weak heuristics, such as means-ends analysis (i.e., analyzing differences 
between the current problem state and the goal state to choose operators that can 
reduce the differences; Sweller, 1988). Although this is a strategy that may allow a 
student to perform well on solving an unknown problem, it does not seem to be a 
very efficient one, because it does not contribute much to schema acquisition -and 
as a result- learning is hampered (Sweller, 1988; Sweller et al., 1998). ‘Learning by 
doing’ has been shown in many other domains to be inferior to instructional for-
mats that provide higher degrees of instructional support or guidance, which are 
much more effective and efficient for novices’ learning (Sweller et al., 1998). There-
fore, it can be questioned whether ‘learning by doing’ is an effective instructional 
strategy for students to learn to reason about cases. 
                                                             
2 If all relevant knowledge and skills are successfully applied, the conclusion can be formulated that: 
Anthony can apply for dissolution. After dissolution of the marriage, Anthony and Beatrice both will keep 
authority regarding the children. And, each may only claim the acquired goods that they brought in indi-
vidually during the marriage. 
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Research questions and overview of this dissertation 
The aim of the studies presented in this dissertation was to gain more insight in the 
kind of difficulties students with differing levels of expertise experience when they 
learn to reason about cases in law school, as well as to investigate instructional for-
mats that might help to diminish or overcome these difficulties. The following re-
search questions are addressed: 1) what are the differences in the structuredness, 
elaborateness, and accurateness of students’ and experts’ legal knowledge? 2) how 
do the availability of conceptual knowledge and information sources affect the 
process and quality of legal reasoning? and 3) are instructional formats that provide 
more support than the regular ‘learning by doing’ approach more effective for lear-
ning, and if so, what type of instructional support (i.e., this can be targeted at differ-
ent processes) is most effective? All of the studies were conducted within the Civil 
law system, focusing on private law (in Dutch: privaatrecht). 
 In Chapter 2, a study is presented on expertise-related differences in conceptual 
and ontological knowledge in the legal domain. The extent and organization of 
conceptual and ontological knowledge of 24 first-year students, 24 third-year stu-
dents, and 12 experts were investigated. By means of a card-sorting task, insight 
was gained into differences in the organization of conceptual knowledge of indi-
viduals at different levels of expertise, a concept-elaboration task provided insight 
into expertise differences in the depth of knowledge about concepts and about asso-
ciations with other concepts. 
 Chapter 3 reports a study exploring expertise-related differences in reasoning 
about cases. The role of conceptual knowledge in reasoning about legal cases was 
studied, first of all by looking at the reasoning process of 24 first-year students, 24 
third-year students, and 12 experts when no external information sources could be 
used (i.e., a civil code, which normally is available to legal professionals and law 
students when working on cases). Secondly, insight into the role of conceptual 
knowledge when using external information sources was gained by comparing the 
performance of first-year students and third-year students who were allowed to use 
a civil code to the performance of those who were not. 
 In Chapter 4, two experiments are reported that build on the findings of the 
studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3. These findings suggested that students indeed 
need additional support for reasoning about cases to enhance their learning. The 
first experiment investigated whether supporting novices’ (79 first-year students) 
reasoning by targeting their lack of conceptual knowledge (i.e., by providing them 
the meaning of concepts), reducing the cognitive load imposed by search processes 
(i.e., by providing them a condensed civil code), or both, positively affects learning. 
The second experiment investigated the effects of providing support for the entire 
reasoning process, through an outline of process-steps, worked examples, or both, 
on both 75 novices’ and 36 advanced students’ learning to reason about cases. In the 
addendum to Chapter 4, the effects of a field study in which worked examples were 
implemented in a real law school setting, that is, a first-year course on property law, 
are described. 
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 Finally, Chapter 5 presents a summary and a discussion of the main findings, in 
terms of theoretical and practical implications and directions for future research. 
 The chapters of this dissertation were written as independent articles, and as a 
consequence, there is some overlap between them. 
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2 
Expertise-related differences in 
conceptual and ontological knowledge 
in the legal domain 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter was published as:  
Nievelstein, F., Van Gog, T., Boshuizen, H. P. A., & Prins, F. J. (2008). Expertise-related differences in 
ontological and conceptual knowledge in the legal domain. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 20, 
1043-1064. 
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Little research has been conducted on expertise-related differences in conceptual and onto-
logical knowledge in law, even though this type of knowledge is prerequisite for correctly 
interpreting and reasoning about legal cases, and differences in conceptual and ontological 
knowledge structures between students and between students and teachers, might lead to 
miscommunication. This study investigated the extent and organization of conceptual and 
ontological knowledge of novices, advanced students, and experts in law, using a card-
sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. The results showed that novices used more eve-
ryday examples and were less accurate in their elaborations of concepts than advanced stu-
dents and experts; on top of that, the organization of their knowledge did not overlap within 
their group (i.e., no ‘shared’ ontology). Experts gave more judicial examples based on the law 
book and were more accurate in their elaborations than advanced students, and their knowl-
edge was strongly overlapping within their group (i.e., strong ontology). Incorrect concep-
tual knowledge seems to impede the correct understanding of cases and the correct applica-
tion of precise and formal rules in law. 
  
A large body of research on the amount and structure of knowledge of individuals 
with different levels of expertise exists in various academic and professional do-
mains such as medicine, management, counselling, and physics (see Chi, Glaser, & 
Farr, 1988; Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & Hoffman 2006). Conclusions that have 
been drawn from those studies are mostly formulated in terms of generalities across 
domains, which might suggest that they are universally valid. However, there are 
also large differences between domains and between specializations within do-
mains in terms of the quality and the structure of expert knowledge, which makes it 
worthwhile to study expertise differences in different domains. For example, Elstein 
(2001), reviews evidence that the nature of expertise in the medical domain varies 
among the different specializations. Hunt (2006) has shown that expertise in a spe-
cific domain is characterized by specialized domain knowledge and specific (cogni-
tive) skills which do not transfer to performing tasks in other domains. 
 Research on knowledge structures and knowledge differences in the domain of 
law is scarce, which is surprising given that the legal domain has some unique char-
acteristics that make it difficult to learn and master (Nievelstein, Van Gog, & Prins, 
2008; Sullivan, Colby, Welch-Wegner, Bond, & Shulman, 2007). First of al, novices in 
law must familiarize themselves with the ‘official’ use of legal language. This can be 
difficult, because many concepts that are routinely used in everyday language often 
have a very specific formal meaning in law (Lindahl, 2004). A second difficulty of 
the legal domain is that certain concepts (i.e., intermediate concepts) are not con-
fined to one single, fixed meaning. In two different legal situations, those interme-
diate concepts could have a different meaning depending on the exact situational 
context (Ashley & Aleven, 1991; Lindahl, 2003; for an example see the section below 
on ‘the role of conceptual knowledge and ontology in law’). Another characteristic 
of the legal domain is that it is adversarial in nature, that is, it requires students to 
learn to take multiple perspectives on the same legal problem (e.g., lawyer, prosecu-
tor, judge). From a certain perspective one should act in a certain way to achieve the 
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obtained goal, but one will only be successful in doing so when possible (coun-
ter)arguments of the opposite party are taken into account. 
 Conceptual and ontological knowledge plays a key role in law: it is prerequisite 
for correctly interpreting and reasoning about legal cases, and differences in concep-
tual and ontological knowledge structures between students themselves and be-
tween students and teachers, might lead to miscommunication about legal rules and 
cases. The term ‘conceptual knowledge’ refers to an individual’s entire knowledge 
base of concepts and relations between concepts, which can be either formally cor-
rect or incorrect (Roth, 1990); two people can assign different meanings to the con-
cept society, for example. The term ontology, in its philosophical definition, refers to 
the conceptual knowledge regarding basic categories of existence in life such as 
plants, animals and objects (see e.g., Kelly & Keil, 1985) and implies knowledge 
about the features and underlying principles of those basic categories. Nowadays, 
the term ontology is often used in the domain of artificial intelligence, where it is 
defined as a formalized conceptual vocabulary that can be seen as a shared and agreed 
upon, explicit representation of a domain (Bench-Capon & Visser, 1997; Chi & Ros-
coe, 2002; Visser & Bench-Capon, 1998), which is the definition we will use here. A 
cardiologist, for example, should have formal conceptual knowledge about the 
functioning of the heart. This formal conceptual knowledge can be referred to as a 
part of the cardiologist’s ontology. In sum, ontological knowledge is conceptual 
knowledge that corresponds to the underlying structure or organization of the do-
main, and hence, correct conceptual domain knowledge should be acquired before a 
domain’s ontology can be mastered (see e.g., Chi & Roscoe, 2002). 
 Correct conceptual and ontological knowledge is important for two main rea-
sons. It is required for correct classification of problems and tasks one encounters 
(Chi, 2005; Roth, 1990), and it is essential for individuals working or studying in the 
same domain to have a similar understanding of concepts in order to communicate 
precisely and without misunderstanding about domain-related problems (Klaus-
meister, 1990). Therefore, studies of how conceptual and ontological knowledge is 
acquired, are important. Not only can they provide interesting information on the 
knowledge of participants with different levels of expertise in a domain, but such 
studies can also ultimately contribute to our understanding of difficulties students 
experience and the development of (educational) support for expertise acquisition 
in these domains (see e.g., Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992; Chi, 2005). 
 Most studies on law expertise have been conducted in the context of artificial 
intelligence and the development of legal knowledge systems (Ashley & Brüning-
haus, 2003; Bench-Capon & Visser, 1997; Visser & Bench-Capon, 1998). However, as 
in the context of expertise research, the question of how conceptual and ontological 
knowledge differs between participants with different levels of expertise in the legal 
domain, has not received much attention in the Artificial Intelligence context either. 
 Therefore, the present study investigates expertise-related differences in con-
ceptual knowledge structures and ontology in law. Expertise in the legal domain is 
interesting to study because this domain has some intrinsic characteristics that make 
it a difficult to learn and master (Nievelstein, et al., 2008), to which we will return 
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below. First, we will discuss research on conceptual knowledge structures in some 
more detail. 
Conceptual knowledge structures 
Findings from research on expertise differences suggest that experts in a domain 
have acquired elaborate mental frameworks or schemas that allow them to effec-
tively and efficiently interpret information or problems that they are confronted 
with. Schemas contain both declarative and procedural knowledge (Chi, 2005; Du-
fresne, Gerace, Thibodeau-Hardiman, & Mestre, 1992; Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
When a task or problem for which a schema has been acquired is encountered, the 
schema will be activated. As a result, the problem is classified as belonging to a 
certain category and an associated solution procedure is activated with varying 
degrees of automation depending on the quality of the schema (Anderson, Rey-
nolds, Schallert, & Goetz, 1977). Dufresne et al. suggested that domain-specific 
knowledge of experts is hierarchically organized in schemas. If experts are con-
fronted with a domain-related problem, a hierarchical, tree-like schema with a top-
down problem solving approach including domain concepts and procedures will be 
activated. Depending on the context and the problem at hand, a specific schema will 
be activated. The meaning of an activated schema is derived from the kind, the posi-
tion and the relation between the activated nodes in the schema (Chi, 1997). Nov-
ices’ problem schemas seem to consist of loosely linked, incomplete, and sometimes 
incorrect knowledge. Therefore, novices’ schemas are less easily activated, and 
when these schemas are activated, they support problem solving to a lesser extent 
than experts’ schemas do (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2000; Dufresne et al., 1992). 
The role of conceptual knowledge and ontology in law 
An important characteristic of the legal profession is that it is very strict about in-
terpreting and relating law concepts. Legal concepts are most important in the pro-
fession to interpret and apply legal rules and jurisprudence in a proper way. A dif-
ficulty that arises here is that many concepts in law (such as ‘demand’ or ‘verdict’) 
that students know from everyday discourse have a different professional signifi-
cance (Lindahl, 2004). A similar difficulty is known to arise in physics, where con-
cepts such as electricity and blood flow, which are known from everyday use, have a 
different, formal meaning that may only partially coincide with the everyday mean-
ing (Chi & Roscoe, 2002). Everyday knowledge about concepts should be altered 
into judicial conceptual knowledge, that is agreed upon between individuals work-
ing in the domain (i.e., ontology). On top of that, some concepts function as ‘inter-
mediate’ concepts, which means that they are flexibly interpretable and their exact 
meaning is determined by specific situational constraints. Depending on the legal 
situation (the facts) the interpretation of the intermediate concept will differ, as a 
result of which the legal consequences differ as well (Lindahl, 2003). For example, 
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the legal situation about one’s ownership of a specific amount of money received by 
inheritance, differs from the legal situation about one’s ownership of a bike received 
as a birthday present from a friend. In the first situation the ‘ownership’ brings al-
ong the duty to pay inheritance taxes, whereas in the second situation becoming an 
owner of a bike by a gift does not oblige the owner to pay any taxes. So the specific 
context determines the obtained rights and responsibilities the intermediate concept 
‘ownership’ brings along. 
 Chi (2005) showed that in physics, concepts could be classified in fixed onto-
logical categories, such as the category of kinematics or the category of flow proc-
esses. This is not the case with law concepts. This is on the one hand related to the 
phenomenon of intermediate concepts, and on the other hand to the fact that prob-
lem solving and reasoning in law is often adversarial, that is, performed in a context 
of debate and disagreement, which requires that one must learn to take multiple 
perspectives in order to anticipate on counterarguments and exceptions (Thagard, 
1992). Despite the strict definitions of legal concepts, it is important that concepts 
can be flexibly applied in distinctive situations. 
Uncovering expertise-related differences in conceptual knowledge structures 
The present study investigates differences in the structure and content of conceptual 
knowledge between novices, advanced students, and experts in civil law, using a 
card-sorting task (De Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1986; Trochim, 1989), which re-
quires participants to group (relate) a certain number of given concepts (printed on 
cards), and a concept elaboration task (Van de Wiel, Boshuizen, & Schmidt, 2000; 
Van de Wiel, Boshuizen, Schmidt, & Schaper, 1999), which requires participants to 
verbalize everything they know about a concept in a short time frame (e.g., 2 or 3 
minutes). 
 Card-sorting tasks provide insight into differences in the organization of con-
ceptual knowledge of individuals at different levels of expertise. Because card-
sorting tasks do not require students to draw or label links between concepts, how-
ever, a concurrent verbal reporting technique will be applied in this study to gather 
information on why certain concepts are clustered together (cf. Ericsson & Simon, 
1993; Van Gog, Paas, Van Merriënboer, & Witte, 2005). Concept-elaboration tasks 
provide insight into expertise differences in the depth of knowledge about concepts 
and about associations with other concepts that are spontaneously reported. 
 Based on previous research that addressed expertise-related differences in con-
ceptual knowledge and ontology using comparable techniques (e.g., Boshuizen & 
Schmidt, 1992; Van de Wiel, et al., 2000) it is expected that experts’ knowledge is not 
only more elaborate and accurate, but also more structured and organized than 
students’ knowledge. This would show, for example, in experts providing more 
central concepts around which they structurally group other concepts in the card-
sorting task, than advanced students and novices, who are likely to sort concepts in 
a less organized, unconnected way. Based on previous research on concept knowl-
edge and elaboration (e.g., Chi & Roscoe, 2002; Van de Wiel, et al., 1999), it is ex-
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pected that novices will have misconceptions about the formal meaning of legal 
concepts. This might lead novices to provide more daily examples instead of giving 
the formal legal meaning in elaborating on legal concepts, because novices only 
know the concepts from daily life. Moreover, experts could be expected to provide 
more accurate, formal concept elaborations (and as a result show more overlap -
indicative of ontology- with other experts in their card sorting as well) than novice 
and advanced students. 
 Specifically, this study investigates expertise-related differences in conceptual 
knowledge and ontology in the legal domain. It is hypothesized that: 1) as expertise 
increases, knowledge would be more hierarchically structured and show more over-
lap with individuals of the same level of expertise, 2) more central concepts would 
be provided in the card sorting task as expertise increases, 3) novices would order 
concepts randomly (without any structure) more often than advanced students and 
experts, 4) concept elaborations would be more accurate as expertise increases 
(which implies a higher degree of overlapping knowledge and agreed upon explicit 
representations, i.e., ontology), and 5) novices will give more daily examples in their 
elaborations than advanced students and experts. 
Method 
Participants 
In total, 48 students involved in private law courses (Dutch specification: 
‘privaatrecht’) and 12 staff members specialized in private law from law schools of 
Dutch universities participated in this study. They were 24 first-year students (nov-
ice group), 24 third-year students (advanced group), and 12 staff members of the 
faculty of law with on average 5.9 years of professional experience after obtaining 
their PhD (expert group). Students received a financial compensation of € 10 for 
their participation. 
Materials 
 Audio recording equipment. Verbalizations were recorded on a laptop computer 
with Audacity 1.2.4b audio editor (http://audacity.sourceforge.net) using a micro-
phone. 
 Card-sorting task. The card-sorting task consisted of 30 different concepts, prin-
ted on separate cards, that were all in some way related to one main concept in civil 
law: ‘tort’. All concepts were derived from the index of the law book (cf. Crombag, 
de Wijkersloot, & Cohen, 1977). 
 Concept-elaboration task. The concept-elaboration task consisted of three central 
concepts (strict liability, damages, tort/unlawful act), one abstract concept (protec-
tive norm), and one intermediate concept (owner), selected from the concepts in the 
card-sorting task. These concepts were identified as central, abstract and intermedi-
ate based on the law book, and this was verified by a domain expert. The central 
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concepts are concrete terms: the tort itself, one condition, and one consequence of 
the tort. The abstract concept is an abstract term that is indirectly related to the main 
concept ‘tort’. Finally the intermediate concept can be interpreted in several ways 
depending on the situation that is characterized. The five concepts were printed on 
separate cards. 
Procedure 
Individual sessions of approximately 40 minutes were scheduled at the law schools. 
Participants first completed the card-sorting task. They were instructed to group the 
30 civil law concepts in such a way that the concepts in one group had stronger 
relations with each other than with concepts sorted in another group. No prompts 
were given as to how many clusters to create. Participants were asked to verbalize 
aloud why they put specific concepts together and how these concepts were related 
to each other, and were instructed to ignore the presence of the experimenter in 
doing so. Participants then completed the concept-elaboration task. They received 
the five concepts one by one in random order, and were instructed to verbalize 
everything they knew about that specific concept, in a fixed time of two minutes per 
concept. After each individual session, a debriefing took place in which the experi-
menter asked participants how they felt about the session and provided information 
about the goal of the study. 
Data analysis 
The card-sorting task was analysed by means of a hierarchical cluster analysis (cf. 
De Jong & Ferguson-Hessler, 1986; Trochim, 1989) of unstructured card sort data in 
SPSS, version 12.0.1. Cluster analysis calculates the strength of the perceived rela-
tionships between concepts, and graphically displays these relationships in dendro-
grams. Each participant’s sorting was represented into a 30 × 30 symmetrical matrix, 
where clustered concepts are represented by 1 and not-clustered concepts by 0. Per 
group a total similarity matrix was calculated by summing all individual matrices. 
In the dendrogram, the sub-clusters are listed along the y-axis. The x-axis deter-
mines the cluster distance: the smaller the distance (farthest left), the greater the 
proximity between concepts. 
 To study the structure of the conceptual knowledge in detail, the total number 
of clusters participants had made upon completing the task was counted by the 
experimenter, and based on participants’ transcribed verbal protocols it was scored 
whether the content of every single pile was composed around one central concept 
or consisted of a string of unconnected concepts. However, it became apparent dur-
ing data analysis that participants also labelled clusters as belonging to specific 
fields of law and mentioned specific concepts as ‘top concept’ to which all clusters 
could be connected. A top concept differed from a central concept in that it con-
nected all single clusters with each other, whereas a central concept only connected 
concepts within one cluster. 
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 Coding scheme. For the concept-elaboration task a coding scheme was developed 
based on concept descriptions in the civil law book (Klomp & Mak, 2005) and based 
on several kinds of examples. Every ‘model’ description of a concept in the law 
book was divided into single elements, which resulted in 10 elements for ‘tort’, 2 for 
‘strict liability’, 4 for ‘damages’, 1 for ‘protective norm’ and 1 for ‘owner’. The num-
ber of the protocol elements that matched the elements of the ‘model’ description 
were counted. Information that was exactly repeated in an elaboration was only 
counted once (e.g., if the same law book element was mentioned twice or if the same 
example was given twice, the second time was not counted). The coding scheme is 
shown in Appendix 1. First, parts of the protocol that corresponded to a law book 
element were scored. Second, given examples in the protocol were scored. Three 
types of examples were distinguished: 1) daily examples not related to an element 
of the concept description in the law book, 2) judicial examples not related to an 
element of the law book, and 3) judicial examples related to an element of the law 
book (see Appendix 2). 
 Two raters independently scored 20 % of the protocols. The inter-rater reliabil-
ity was .78 (Cohen’s kappa). Because the inter-rater reliability was sufficiently high 
(i.e., higher than .70; Van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994), the remaining pro-
tocols were scored by one rater. For the analyses we only used the scores of the rater 
who scored all protocols. 
Results 
Card sorting task 
To address the first hypothesis that more expertise leads to more hierarchically 
structured knowledge, hierarchical cluster analyses were performed on the data of 
each group. The resulting dendrograms are shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3. The results 
of the cluster analyses illustrated that novices show no specific pattern in the way 
they clustered the concepts. Their clustering was mainly based on connecting two or 
three concepts that have a basic ‘cause-consequence’ relationship. Examples are the 
clusters ‘owner’-‘ownership’ and ‘injury’- ‘emotional damage’. However, these 
relationships were not embedded in meaningful clusters. The dendrogram of the 
advanced students showed that the first and the second strong clusters (proximity 
level < 0.7) were related with each other at the proximity level of 0.3. Only concepts 
related to the tenet ‘tort’ were strongly clustered together. The related concepts 
reflected the four conditions of a ‘tort’: ‘damage’ (and its specific types of damage 
and damages), ’causality’, ’liability’ and ’protective norm’. One other strong cluster 
was made up of the concepts ‘owner’, ‘ownership’, and ‘object’. These concepts are 
central to the field of ‘property law’. The experts’ dendrogram reflected an obvious 
division between one cluster about the field of ‘patrimonial law’ (concepts 12 to 20 
vertically) in general on the one hand, and a specific split between one cluster about 
the field of ‘property law’ (concepts 8 to 23 vertically) and one cluster about the field 
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of ‘law of obligations’(concepts 26 to 22 vertically). This conceptual division corre-
sponded to a detailed ‘fields of law’ description in a key textbook on Dutch Civil 
law (Boon, Reijntjes, & Rinkes, 2003), in which important concepts for the different 
fields are stressed. For example, the concepts owner, ownership and object are 
stressed as important terms in the field of ‘property law’. 
 To test the second and third hypotheses that experts would provide more cen-
tral concepts to build their clusters than novices and advanced students, and that 
novices will create clusters far more often based on randomly ordered concepts than 
advanced students and experts, the protocol data were analysed. The number of 
times participants created their clusters around central concepts or constructed 
clusters with unconnected strings of concepts was analysed by means of ANOVA 
(significance level set at .05) with level of expertise as independent variable. No 
differences were found between groups in the number of clusters they made F (2, 
57) = 2.39, ns. Each group made 7 clusters on average. Table 1 shows the mean num-
ber of times participants created clusters a) around central concepts, b) based on 
randomly ordered, unconnected concepts, c) based on fields of law and d) under 
top concepts. A one-way ANOVA showed a significant effect of level of expertise 
for the four types of clusters: clusters created around one ‘central concept’ F (2, 57) = 
10.14, MSE = 2.26, p < .001, f = .60, clusters that consist of ‘unconnected concepts’ 
F (2, 57) = 12.27, MSE = 5.40, p < .001, f = .66, clusters composed around ‘fields of law’ 
F (2, 57) = 25.78, MSE = .43, p < .001, f = .95, and clusters linked to one ‘top concept’ 
F (2, 57) = 8.76, MSE = .12, p < .001, f = .55. 
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Figure 1. Novices’ dendrogram 
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Figure 2. Advanced students’ dendrogram. 
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Figure 3. Experts’ dendrogram 
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Table 1. Means for the type of card sort methods per group 
 Novices  Advanced students  Experts 
Method  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Central concepts 2.12E 1.08  2.71E 1.27  4.50N,A 2.43 
Random order 5.17E,A 2.85  2.63N 2.08  1.50N 1.38 
Fields of law 0.00E 0.00  0.17E 0.48  2.17N,A 1.47 
Top concepts 0.00E 0.00  0.08E 0.28  0.50N,A 0.67 
N, A, E In post-hoc multiple comparisons (after ANOVA, p < .05) significantly different from Novices, 
Advanced students and Experts. 
Bonferroni post-hoc tests (significance level .05) showed that experts mentioned 
significantly more central concepts, more fields of law and more top concepts while 
composing the clusters, than both novices and advanced students. Furthermore, it 
was shown that novices ordered their concept clusters significantly more often on a 
random basis than advanced students and experts.  
Concept-elaboration task 
Table 2 shows the means for the elements mentioned accurately with regard to the 
model description. We hypothesized that with increasing levels of law expertise 
accuracy of concept elaborations would increase (hypothesis 4). A one-way 
ANOVA showed a significant effect of expertise on accuracy of all five concepts 
together F (2, 57) = 17.00, MSE = 4.96, p < .001, f = .77. This significant effect is also 
found regarding the accuracy of the five concepts separately: ‘strict liability’ F (2, 57) 
= 12.98 MSE = .28, p < .001, f = .67, ‘tort/unlawful act’ F (2, 57) = 6.45, MSE = 3.19 p < 
.01, f = .48, ‘damages’ F (2, 57) = 3.60 MSE = .62, p < .05, f = .36,‘protective norm’ F (2, 
57) = 17.90, MSE = .16, p <.001, f = .79, and ‘owner’ F (2, 57) = 15.44, MSE = .17, p < 
.001, f = . 74.  
Table 2. Means for the accurately defined elements per group 
 Novices  Advanced Students  Experts 
Concepts  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Strict liability (central) 0.25E 0.44  0.38 E 0.49  1.17N,A 0.72 
Damages (central) 0.37 0.77  0.17E 0.38  0.92A 1.31 
Tort/Unlawful act 
(central) 
4.13A 2.32  2.63N,E 1.37  4.58A 1.08 
Protective norm  
(abstract) 
0.38E 0.50  0.17E 0.38  1.00N,A 0.00 
Owner (intermediate) 0.25A,E 0.44  0.71N 0.46  1.00N 0.00 
Total  5.38E 2.84  4.00E 1.56  8.58N,A 1.93 
N, A, E In post-hoc multiple comparisons (after ANOVA, p < .05) significantly different from Novices, 
Advanced students and Experts. 
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Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that in line with our hypothesis, experts were 
significantly more accurate in elaborating on the three central concepts than the 
advanced students, and that, surprisingly, novices were significantly more accurate 
in elaborating on one central concept, the ‘tort’, than advanced students. Further-
more, in line with our hypothesis, experts were significantly more accurate than 
novices and advanced students in elaborating on the abstract concept and experts 
and advanced students were both more accurate in elaborating on the intermediate 
concept than novices. Because intermediate concepts can have a different meaning 
depending on the exact situational context, this finding suggests that increasing 
expertise is characterized by the ability to flexibly activate different schemas with 
regard to a single judicial concept. 
 Because we expected novices in the domain of civil law to know domain-related 
concepts from everyday discourse instead of legal definitions, we hypothesized 
(hypothesis 5) that they would provide more examples in their explanations than 
advanced students and experts. The number of examples given in the concept-
elaboration task were counted, and three types of examples were distinguished. 
Table 3 shows the mean number of daily examples (i.e., not related to elements of 
the law book; Type 1), judicial examples not related to elements of the law book 
(Type 2), and judicial examples related to elements of the law book (Type 3) given in 
the concept-elaboration task. A one-way ANOVA on expertise differences regarding 
Type 1 examples for the five concepts shows a significant expertise effect F (2, 57) = 
227.56, MSE = 1.75, p < .001, f = 2.83. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that novices 
use significantly more daily examples in their concept elaborations than advanced 
students and experts. Significant differences between groups were also found in the 
number of Type 2 examples given, F (2, 57) = 6.99, MSE = .21, p < .01, f = .49. Novices 
gave significantly more judicial examples which were not related to the elements of 
the law book concerning the concept content. A one-way ANOVA on expertise 
differences in Type 3 examples showed a significant expertise effect F (2, 57) = 20.93, 
MSE = 8.02, p < .001, f = .86. Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that as expertise de-
velops, participants will use significantly more Type 3 examples in their elabora-
tions. In other words, advanced students used significantly more Type 3 examples 
than novices whereas experts used significantly more Type 3 examples than ad-
vanced students. The data in the table show that experts gave most Type 3 examples, 
on average, for the intermediate concept ‘owner’, whereas novices gave most Type 3 
examples, on average, for the three central concepts ‘strict liability’, ‘damages’ and 
‘tort’.  
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Discussion 
This study investigated how acquired conceptual knowledge structures differ be-
tween novices, advanced students and experts. We hypothesized that 1) knowledge 
would become more hierarchically structured and would show more overlap as 
expertise increases, 2) more central concepts would be provided in the card sorting 
task as expertise increases, 3) novices would order concepts randomly more often 
than advanced students and experts, 4) concept elaborations would be more accu-
rate as expertise increases and, 5) novices will give more daily examples in their 
elaborations than advanced students and experts. The results of the hierarchical 
cluster analyses and verbal protocol analyses support our hypotheses that knowl-
edge becomes more hierarchically structured with increasing expertise. It was 
shown that experts used the same central concepts to create clusters, embedded in 
specific fields of law with connections to single top concepts. For advanced stu-
dents, only their knowledge regarding the tenet ‘tort’ was hierarchically structured 
and overlapping, the other concepts were not yet strongly connected nor structured 
in a hierarchical whole. Novices’ knowledge seemed highly fragmented, they strung 
concepts together while hardly reporting any meaningful connections between 
concepts, and their clusters were highly idiosyncratic. 
 These findings suggest that conceptual knowledge networks of novices in the 
same domain are very different from each other. In other words, even though stu-
dents are enrolled in the same curriculum, there is no indication of overlapping 
knowledge (i.e., mastery of ontology) in the very first stage of legal expertise devel-
opment. However, individuals at a high expertise level have a more similar knowl-
edge base than individuals at lower expertise levels. Furthermore, these findings 
suggest that with developing expertise in law, knowledge about concepts and the 
relations between concepts will gradually become hierarchically structured (e.g., 
third year students’ showed hierarchical and overlapping knowledge of ‘tort’ but 
not of the other concepts), and eventually, at the expert level, will also be clustered 
according to different fields of law (a very high level in the hierarchy). 
 In addition, our hypothesis was supported that experts would be more accurate 
in elaborating on legal concepts in formal language than novices and advanced 
students. Unexpectedly, however, novices were more accurate in defining the con-
cept ‘tort’ than advanced students. A possible explanation for this finding is sug-
gested by the remark of some of the first year students during the debriefing that 
they had just finished a course component about the tenet tort with an exam, so it is 
plausible that novices knew the definitions by heart at that moment. With regard to 
our hypothesis that novices would use more daily examples in their elaborations, 
the results indeed indicate that novices use a lot of everyday language and daily 
examples in elaborating on legal concepts. Advanced students used fewer daily 
examples on average than novices but still significantly more than experts. Fur-
thermore, we found that experts gave most judicial examples for the concept 
‘owner’. The hierarchical knowledge structure of experts might explain their ability 
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to flexibly and contextually interpret this intermediate legal concept (compared to 
the central and abstract concepts). When experts are confronted with an intermedi-
ate concept they are able to interpret the concept differently depending on the situ-
ated context; a different context activates a different schema. 
 The results of the cluster analysis and accuracy of elaborations provide indica-
tions of ontological differences. It seems that novices have not yet acquired any 
formal and overlapping explicit judicial representation of these concepts and the 
domain, which may explain why they rely heavily on their everyday conceptual 
knowledge. As expertise increases, conceptual knowledge changes into formal 
knowledge of the domain, which becomes strongly overlapping among experts, 
indicated by experts’ agreement about the kind of concepts reflected in meaningful 
clusters in the cluster analyses and higher accuracy of their concept elaborations. 
 This study has some limitations. For instance, we distinguished expertise levels 
based on years of enrolment, rather than on a pre-test of task or domain specific 
knowledge. Large within-group expertise differences are unlikely, because the nov-
ices were in their first year and had just started, whereas the advanced students 
were in their third year and had completed half of the curriculum, and because law 
is not a subject taught in secondary education or encountered easily in extracurricu-
lar activities. However, it is possible that some novices have had some prior experi-
ence with law before entering the university, or that some third-year students 
gained less knowledge than their peers during these years of study, making them 
more similar to novices. A task-specific pre-test (or rapid pre-test; cf. Kalyuga, 2006) 
would have allowed detection of such possible, though unlikely, exceptions. A re-
lated issue concerns the content of the curriculum and the task. The findings regard-
ing the novices’ accuracy of elaborations of the concept ‘tort’ show that certain de-
viations in results may arise as a consequence of the particular information just 
provided in the curriculum. A task-specific pre-test could also be used to obtain 
information about specific differences in prior knowledge within and between 
groups as a consequence of the curriculum. 
 As for theoretical relevance of this study, because there are large differences 
between domains and between specializations within domains in terms of the qual-
ity and the structure of expert knowledge, it is worthwhile to study expertise differ-
ences in different domains. Some of our findings correspond to those of expertise 
research in other professional domains, for example that increasing expertise leads 
to hierarchically structured knowledge (cf. Dufresne et al., 1992; Van de Wiel et al., 
2000). Other findings, however, seem to be related to unique characteristics of the 
legal domain, for example, that the ability to flexibly interpret intermediate legal 
concepts, depending on the described legal situation, increases with increasing ex-
pertise. 
 Knowledge is a key aspect, but not the sole aspect of expertise (see Ericsson et 
al., 2006). Thus, future research should also look into how differences in conceptual 
knowledge influence the ability to reason about legal cases, in order to obtain a 
more comprehensive picture of expertise acquisition in the legal domain. Another 
interesting future study would be to use a longitudinal design to investigate how 
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conceptual knowledge develops with increasing expertise, because the cross-
sectional design we used here allowed the investigation of expertise-related differ-
ences in conceptual knowledge at certain stages of expertise, but does not allow 
conclusions on how these differences came about. 
 Regarding practical relevance, conceptual and ontological knowledge is very 
important for the correct classification of problems and tasks, as well as for commu-
nication in the domain. Moreover, conceptual knowledge is of pivotal importance 
for legal skills such as reasoning, defending cases from different points of view (e.g., 
judge, public prosecutor) and taking into account possible actions of the opposition. 
Hence, studies such as this one not only foster our insight in domain-specific know-
ledge of participants at different levels of expertise, but can also provide a starting 
point for more applied future research on how to facilitate knowledge and skill 
acquisition, as well as communication in the domain. First of all, future studies 
could develop and study the effects of different kinds of educational support tools. 
The instruction students nowadays receive in order to learn to argue on cases is 
mainly by arguing on cases itself. Given the important role conceptual and onto-
logical knowledge plays in this skill, and given that novice students lack this kind of 
knowledge, this form of instruction might become more effective when additional 
support is provided (e.g., worked-out examples, process worksheets). Secondly, 
future research might look into communication processes. Lack of overlapping 
knowledge (ontology) might complicate communication between students, which 
could be a problem in collaborative learning settings, and differences in ontology 
might complicate communication between experts (teachers and professionals) and 
students (cf. Bromme, Rambow, & Nückles, 2001). 
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Appendix 1 
The coding scheme of the concept elaboration task 
Concepts Coding elements Total no. 
elements 
Strict liability The liability of a person committing a tort (1) in which it plays no part 
whether the person him/herself can be blamed for the tort (1) 
(the attribution of the perpetrator occurs, irrespective of this person has 
‘guilt’ in the tort) 
2 
Damages Compensation based on statutory regulations (1) or based on contractual 
obligations (1). Damages should be paid in money (1) however a judge 
can adjudge other types, no monetary, payments (1) 
4 
Tort/Unlawful act A tort is a contravention of the law (1) or that which, according to com-
mon law, the social order becomes (1) except for the existence of justifica-
tion grounds (1) a tort is either an infringement on someone’s rights (1) 
or an act or a refrain (1) whether the perpetrator of the tort is also guilty 
to pay the damages depends on the following factors: 
- The behaviour is unlawful (1) 
- There is damage (1) 
- There is a causal connection between the unlawful behaviour and the 
damage (1) 
- The unlawful behaviour can be ascribed to the perpetrator (1) 
- Relativity and violated standard (1) 
10 
Protective norm There is no obligation to pay damages in the case the violated standard 
does not reach to protect against the damage the injured party has suf-
fered (1) 
1 
Owner Ownership is the most including right an owner has regarding an object 
(1) 
1 
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Appendix 2 
Examples regarding type 1, type 2 and type 3 examples of the concept elaboration task 
Examples  Examples of specific types 
Type 1  a) ‘strict liability’: ‘Strict liability is for example if you know that if you lend your bike to 
someone and this person falls on the street as a result of which (s)he dies.’ 
b) ‘damages’: ‘For example if someone threatens you with a gun and you cannot sleep 
anymore, you can claim damages.’ 
Type 2 a) ‘tort’: ‘ If I remember correctly, it is something about the Cohen judgement, with that 
false employee . . . ’ 
b) ‘protective norm’ Well I remember an example about a judgement concerning the 
pollution of a pond. As a result of this pollution a restaurant nearby had fewer visitors. 
The question was whether this restaurant was protected by the protective norm for it’s 
damages.’ 
Type 3 a) ‘tort’: ‘A tort is a so-called out of contractual obligation. There are a few situational 
constraints that point at the presence of a tort: There should be material damage or 
personal harm, there has to be guilt and causality . . . ’ 
b) ‘strict liability’: ‘For damage, harmed to a third party, through a mistake by a subor-
dinate (employee). The employer is responsible if (s)he created a certain risk to perform 
a certain task.’  
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3 
Effects of conceptual knowledge and 
availability of information sources on 
law students’ legal reasoning 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter is in press as:  
Nievelstein, F., Van Gog, T., Boshuizen, H. P. A., & Prins, F. J. (in press). Effects of conceptual knowledge 
and availability of information sources on law students’ legal reasoning. Instructional Science. 
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Due to the complexity of the legal domain, reasoning about law cases is a very complex skill. 
For novices in law school, legal reasoning is even more complex because they have not yet 
acquired the conceptual knowledge needed for distilling the relevant information from cases, 
determining applicable rules, and searching for rules and exceptions in external information 
sources such as law books. This study investigated the role of conceptual knowledge in solv-
ing legal cases when no information sources can be used. Under such ‘unsupported’3 cir-
cumstances, novice and advanced students performed less well than domain experts, but 
even experts’ performance was rather low. The second question addressed was whether nov-
ices even benefit from the availability of information sources (i.e., law book), because concep-
tual knowledge is prerequisite for effective use of such sources. Indeed availability of the law 
book positively affected performance only for advanced students but not for novice students. 
Implications for learning and instruction in the domain of law are discussed.  
  
Reasoning about cases is a key component of the legal profession, and consequently, 
of legal education. Legal reasoning is a complex cognitive skill (Stratman, 2002), and 
this complexity results mostly from the characteristics of the legal domain (Blasi, 
1995). The legal domain differs from other domains such as medicine or engineering 
in that during task performance, professionals have to rely heavily on information 
sources, that is, books of reference such as law books and jurisprudence (Sullivan, 
Colby, Welch-Wegner, Bond, & Shulman, 2007; Williams, 1992). Consequently, the 
preferred method of instruction for learning to reason about law cases, is working 
on cases with the aid of the external information sources professionals in law would 
use. We argue here, however, that it is questionable whether this method of instruc-
tion is the most optimal one, especially for novice students, because they lack cor-
rect conceptual knowledge (Blasi, 1995; Deegan, 1995; Lindahl, 2004; Nievelstein, 
Van Gog, Boshuizen, & Prins, 2008, Chapter 2), which is needed to understand -and 
reason about- cases and external information. 
 This study investigates the role of availability of conceptual knowledge in two 
ways. First, by looking at how expertise influences reasoning about a case when no 
information sources are available. Second, it is investigated whether the availability 
of information sources actually helps students, especially novices, in solving legal 
cases. Before going into detail about the role that conceptual knowledge and infor-
mation sources play in legal reasoning, we will first shortly describe commonalities 
and differences in legal reasoning between the Common law and Civil law systems. 
                                                             
3 In this Chapter the term ‘unsupported’ is used to refer to the intervention in which students were not 
allowed to use an information source during reasoning about a case, which is a very unusual procedure in 
law schools. However, this term should not be taken to imply that the regular situation in which students 
are able to use this information source, does provide support for their reasoning (see also Chapter 4). 
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Common vs. ivil law 
Despite differences between the systems, reasoning about legal cases is a complex 
skill both in Common law (Anglo-Saxon) and Civil law (European-Continental; 
Vandevelde, 1996). To reason about legal problems in Common law, lawyers rely 
heavily on applying jurisprudence, that is, on solving cases by analogy (Marchant, 
Robinson, Anderson, & Schadewald, 1993). The structural characteristics (relevant 
legal facts and context) of a current case should be compared and contrasted with 
structural features of prior relevant cases to infer whether the same conclusion 
could be drawn (Aamodt & Plaza, 1994). In high court, a present case always has to 
be decided according to a past case judgement. In lower court, judges have the right 
to decide alternatively (Marchant et al., 1993; Vandevelde, 1996). Analogical case-
based reasoning also plays a role in the Civil law system, but less pronounced. In 
Civil law, legal reasoning relies more heavily on interpretation and application of 
codified legal rules to cases (Stratman, 2004). The legal rules are codified for differ-
ent law domains, such as in the civil code or the commercial code. Judges decide 
cases primarily based on the rules, but when the codes and statutes cannot give a 
decisive answer about the judgement on a legal problem, judges have to base their 
decision on similar past cases (Vandevelde, 1996). However, both in Common law 
and in Civil law, conceptual knowledge and the use of information sources (i.e., 
jurisprudence or codes) play a key role in reasoning about cases. 
The role of available conceptual knowledge and information sources in legal reasoning 
Conceptual knowledge. Having correct conceptual knowledge is prerequisite for cor-
rect legal reasoning (Deegan, 1995; Lindahl, 2004; Lundeberg, 1987; Williams, 1992). 
First of all, conceptual knowledge is required to understand the legal problem, that 
is, to decide what information in a particular case is important and what is redun-
dant (i.e., irrelevant). Second, it is necessary to decide what kind of rules or juris-
prudence should be searched for, and to interpret and apply these correctly. Nievel-
stein et al. (2008, Chapter 2) showed that novices and advanced students had less 
formal and less shared knowledge about legal concepts and the relations between 
those concepts than law experts. Formalized shared knowledge is referred to as the 
ontology of the domain (Bench-Capon & Visser, 1997; Chi & Roscoe, 2002). The 
acquisition of correct conceptual knowledge is a difficult process in many domains, 
because many concepts that are routinely used in everyday language have a differ-
ent formal meaning (see e.g., Slotta & Chi, 2006). This also occurs very often in the 
legal domain (see e.g., Lindahl, 2004; Lundeberg 1987). The findings of Nievelstein 
et al. also showed that novice students provided naïve and fragmented elaborations 
of concepts using mostly everyday language. In addition, there was hardly any 
shared knowledge within their group (i.e., individual knowledge about legal con-
cepts differed enormously). Advanced students had more correct conceptual know-
ledge, used fewer daily examples, and used more formal legal language than nov-
ices, but they did not yet show much shared knowledge either. 
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 Information sources. In solving legal problems, professionals have to rely on in-
formation sources such as databases containing jurisprudence, or codes and statutes 
(Williams, 1992), because every case judgement should be defined precisely (i.e., 
based on books of reference) in such a way that the judgement can be inferred ex-
actly by others engaged in the legal process (Sullivan et al., 2007). Existing jurispru-
dence, the exact meaning of rules, and exceptions on rules can be looked up at any 
time in order to check or substantiate argumentation. However, next to knowledge 
of how these information sources are organized, conceptual knowledge is also nec-
essary to make effective use of these information sources (Williams, 1992), that is, to 
find the right rules or jurisprudence, understand this information, and link it to the 
case. 
Legal reasoning 
In problem solving, including solving legal cases, a number of general problem-
solving phases can be distinguished (cf., Veenman & Elshout, 1995). Orientation on 
the problem/case (i.e., framing the problem), planning (e.g., what steps, and in which 
order, should I take to solve the problem?), executing (e.g., elaborating on a prob-
lem/case and drawing conclusions), monitoring the problem solving process (i.e., in-
between evaluations, e.g., am I still on the right track, on time?), and finally evaluat-
ing the entire process and the final product (e.g., how did I do overall?). Orientation, 
planning, monitoring and evaluating can be seen as regulation phases whereas the 
executing phase consists of elaborating on the problem and drawing conclusions. 
There is no fixed order through these phases, and phases can be revisited. Expertise 
seems to influence the amount and duration of engagement in these general proc-
esses. In law for example, Lundeberg (1987), compared novices’ (i.e., non-lawyers) 
and experts’ approaches of case reading. During case reading, more experts than 
novices used general strategies; they put the case into context, made an overview, 
reread, underlined, synthesized and evaluated information from the case. Oates 
(2006) also showed that during case reading a law professor summarized and eva-
luated information from the case more often than law students did. 
 In legal reasoning, the execution phase consists mainly of elaborating arguments 
and drawing conclusions on claims regarding applicability of rules. According to 
Toulmin’s model of argument, elaborating arguments and drawing conclusions can 
be subdivided into six different steps: 1) grounds, 2) warrants, 3) backings, 4) rebuttals, 
5) qualifiers, and 6) conclusions (Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1984; see also Vandevelde, 
1996). For instance, in solving a legal case, a lawyer must first distinguish and ex-
tract the legally relevant facts (grounds) from the case information. Based on the 
relevant facts, applicable sources of law referred to as warrants (e.g., rules of law and 
statutes) have to be identified, along with possible additional information like a 
reference to generally accepted knowledge, norms or jurisprudence, which can 
strengthen the warrant (i.e., backings). These warrants and backings have to be com-
pared to the grounds to test whether rules are indeed applicable to these facts. Ap-
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plicable rules of law have to be placed in a specific sequence in which the more 
specific rules will be tested after the more general rules have proven valid. Rebuttals 
are information elements from the case that require the application of exceptions on 
rules, and the qualifier reflects the probability of a legally correct conclusion on the 
basis of the available grounds, warrants, backings and rebuttals. The final conclusion 
(i.e., judgement) should be drawn, consisting of that which, based on available in-
formation, can be asserted. 
The present study 
The present study addresses how the availability of conceptual knowledge and 
information sources affects the process and quality of legal reasoning in the Civil 
law (European-Continental) system. 
 The first question investigated here concerns the role of conceptual knowledge 
in legal reasoning. In order to study this question, we compared novices and ad-
vanced students with experts in an ‘unsupported’ condition, in which they could 
not rely on information sources. Because in practice, legal professionals can always 
rely on information sources when working on cases, it is unclear to what extent they 
depend on these sources, and to what extent their acquired conceptual knowledge 
(i.e., their expertise) can help them solve a case. It is hypothesized that: 1) students 
(novice and advanced) will be less accurate in solving a legal case than experts, and 
2) because students have much less conceptual knowledge than experts, we expect 
differences in the problem-solving process, with students showing less regulation 
and execution activities than experts. 
 Probably because legal professionals rely on information sources when solving 
cases, the preferred method of instruction is having students solve cases with the 
aid of such sources. However, we argue that even under such ‘natural’ conditions 
where students can make use of information sources, it is questionable whether this 
can help novice students, because adequate use of these sources would also rely on 
conceptual knowledge, as well as on knowledge of how the source is organized. 
Lack of such knowledge would probably result in ineffective search strategies when 
using the information source, which imposes a heavy additional load on working 
memory (cf. Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998), thereby reducing the cogni-
tive resources available for reasoning about the case. That is, when a student does 
not know exactly what (s)he is looking for, or does not know where to look for that 
information, the search space becomes very large and students may get ‘lost’ in the 
search process itself. Consequently, given the limited capacity in terms of quantity 
and duration of working memory (see Cowan, 2001; Miller, 1956), it will be difficult 
if not impossible to keep the case details active in working memory, let alone link-
ing possibly relevant information to the case. 
 Therefore, the second question addressed here is whether novice students can 
benefit from the availability of an information source (in this study: the civil code). 
It is hypothesized that: 3a) novices allowed to use the civil code would not be more 
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accurate in solving the legal case compared to novices who are not allowed to use it, 
whereas 3b) advanced students who are allowed to use the civil code, would be 
more accurate in solving the legal case than advanced students who are not allowed 
to use this source, because contrary to novices, they have sufficient (conceptual) 
knowledge to find and benefit from the information in the civil code (i.e., they can 
understand and apply the information). Furthermore, 4) both novices and advanced 
students’ general problem-solving process will be affected by the use of an external 
source. Those who have more information at their disposal, are expected to show 
more regulation and execution activities than the advanced and novice students 
who were not allowed to use the civil code. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-eight students enrolled in private law courses (Dutch specification: 
‘privaatrecht’) and 12 staff members specialized in private law participated in this 
study. Students were 24 first-year students (novices) who recently completed an 
introductory course on civil law, and 24 third-year students (advanced students) 
who additionally completed two more extensive private law courses. The 12 mem-
bers of the faculty of law had on average 5.9 years of experience with civil law after 
obtaining their PhD (experts). Students received a financial compensation of €10 (ca. 
$14 at the time of writing) for their participation, and experts received a present of 
about the same amount of money, but were not informed about this in advance. 
Design 
There are three expertise groups: novices, advanced students, and experts. The nov-
ice and advanced students were randomly assigned to a condition in which they 
could or could not use an information source (i.e., the civil code). This resulted in 
five conditions: novices without civil code (n = 12), novices with civil code (n = 12), 
advanced students without civil code (n = 12), advanced students with civil code (n 
= 12), and experts (without civil code; n = 12). 
Materials 
 Case. A Civil law case printed on A4 paper. This case concerned law of obliga-
tions and described a conflict between two civilians (the plaintiff, Mr. S., and the 
defendant, Mr. D.) about the ownership and the garaging of a sailing boat. Based on 
the context, five legal claims were described (i.e., right of reclamation, right of reten-
tion, costs of garaging, finder’s reward, and legal costs; see Appendix). 
 Civil code. In the civil code (Klomp & Mak, 2005) statutes and rules, applicable in 
civil procedures, are codified. 
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 Think-aloud instruction and recording. Participants were instructed to argue on the 
case from the perspective of the defendant’s lawyer, and while doing so, to think 
aloud, that is, to verbalize everything that came to their mind without any restric-
tions (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). Their verbalizations were directly recorded onto a 
laptop computer with Audacity 1.2.4b audio editor, using a microphone. 
Procedure 
The experiment was run in individual sessions. Participants were given a maximum 
time of 30 minutes to work on the case. First, they were instructed to read the case 
aloud for up to five minutes. After reading the case, participants were instructed to 
analyse the case from the perspective of the defendant’s lawyer, and to give an 
elaborate description of how they would solve the problem in the specific case. 
Students in the conditions with civil code received the additional instruction that 
they could use the civil code on their desk at any time. In case participants stopped 
thinking aloud, the experimenter prompted them after about 5 seconds by saying 
that they should continue to think aloud. The recorded verbalizations were tran-
scribed after the experiment. 
Data analysis 
Reasoning process. The coding scheme used to analyse the think-aloud protocols in 
terms of general problem-solving processes was based on the one used in a pilot 
study by Nievelstein, Boshuizen, Van Bruggen, and Prins (2005), and was further 
refined with a subset of protocols from the present study. The problem-solving 
process was categorized by four main regulative categories, that is, Orientation, 
Planning, Monitoring, and Evaluating, and by two main executive categories, 
Elaborating and Concluding. Orientation was subdivided into problem orientation 
(e.g., reading aloud, summarizing, perspective taking, labelling, making assump-
tions, and identifying knowledge gaps), and into activating domain knowledge 
(e.g., using conceptual knowledge, using the civil code). Planning concerned re-
marks about the steps one would or should take to solve the problem. Monitoring 
concerned in-between evaluations of the problem solving process, whereas evalua-
tions about the final product fell into the category Evaluating. The categories Elabo-
rating and Concluding comprised arguments or conclusions, respectively, with 
regard to one of the five claims mentioned in the case. 
 The protocols were segmented and coded based on meaning, that is, parts of the 
protocol that could be assigned as a whole to one of the categories, were coded as 
one segment. Two raters independently scored 25 % of the protocols. The inter-rater 
reliability was .81 (Cohen’s kappa). Because this inter-rater reliability was high (.70 
is considered sufficient; Van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994) the remaining 
protocols were scored by one rater. Our analysis was based on the total number of 
codes per problem-solving process category (i.e., the frequencies). The process of 
segmentation and coding was done with the software program Multiple Episode 
Protocol Analysis (MEPA; Erkens 2002). 
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 Accuracy of reasoning. To investigate the quality of the argumentations (i.e., the 
parts of the protocol that were coded as belonging to the executive process catego-
ries of ‘elaborating’ and ‘concluding’), a coding scheme based on Toulmin’s Model 
of Argument (Toulmin et al., 1984) was used, which was also tested in the pilot 
study by Nievelstein et al. (2005). This coding scheme consisted of five out of the six 
categories: grounds, warrants, backings, rebuttals and the final conclusion. We decided 
to exclude the qualifying category because a qualifier would reflect the participants’ 
subjective certainty of the accuracy of the answer, which is more of a regulative 
statement, and would therefore fall in the Monitoring or Evaluation categories. 
 Per claim mentioned in the case, elaborations and conclusions given by the 
participants were expounded in Toulmins’ model of argument to reveal complete-
ness of reasoning. The relevant judicial case information regarding to one of the five 
claims can be seen as the ground on which arguments and/or conclusions could be 
based. First the grounds described in the case (i.e., maximum five) identified by 
participants, were counted. Parts of the protocol that belonged to the categories of 
elaborating (i.e., argumentation) and concluding were coded per legal claim as be-
ing either a warrant, conclusion, backing or rebuttal. The accuracy of those war-
rants, conclusions, backings and rebuttals was rated according to an answer model 
(cf. those used by teachers to grade case elaborations solutions on tests or exams) 
that contained detailed elaborations of the five claims based on the descriptions of 
the five claims in the Dutch civil code. For every correct warrant, conclusion, back-
ing and rebuttal, consistent with the answer model, one point was scored. In total 24 
points could be assigned. 
Results and discussion 
The means and standard deviations regarding the accuracy of reasoning, are shown 
in Table 1, those regarding the reasoning process are shown in Table 2. 
Effects of availability of conceptual knowledge 
 Accuracy of reasoning. In line with our first hypothesis, a planned contrast 
showed that students were less accurate than experts, that is, the sum of the correct 
warrants, backings, rebuttals and conclusions for the five different claims in the 
case, was significantly lower for students (M = 3.92, SD = 3.13), than for experts (M = 
7.75, SD = 3.75), t(55) = 3.02, p < .05, d = 1.11. The following excerpts from a student’s 
and an expert’s protocol illustrate their elaborations on the claim ‘right of retention’. 
Student: ‘Well the right of retention I think that it never existed at all. I do not know exactly 
why because I do not exactly know what the right of retention means . . . ’ Expert: ‘Mr D is 
still the owner of the sailing boat, Mr S cannot claim that he is the owner because Mr S took 
charge of the sailing boat so he did not become the owner. Mr S should have required an 
ownership certificate of the sailing boat. Well, let’s see. The right of retention existed until 
the police took possession of the sailing boat . . . ’ 
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 However, experts’ mean score was not very high: on average, they scored only 
7.25 out of 24 points. One might suppose that this score reflects that experts might 
be able to draw adequate conclusions, but might depend on a law book to provide 
the exact argumentation, but that was not the case. A closer look at the accuracy 
scores shows that experts’ mentioned only 47% of the correct conclusions, and 30% 
of the correct argumentation elements according to the coding scheme (i.e., war-
rants, backings, rebuttals). Therefore, this finding suggests that experts do not only 
rely on the use of information sources for substantiating their conclusions, but also 
for drawing them. This is probably because law professionals routinely use infor-
mation sources when they are working on cases in everyday practice (Williams, 
1992). Without having access to those sources, they experience difficulties applying 
the formal law properly. A quote from an expert protocol can illustrate this. ‘Well, 
this specific problem is more or less similar to a decree I know . . . Hmm, the easiest way to 
solve this case is to search for this decree . . . but that is not possible now . . . ’ Another 
expert mentioned: ‘ First I should search in the code what specifically is said about owner-
ship and depository . . . ’  
Table 1. The means and standard deviations of reasoning accuracy scores of novice students, ad-
vanced students and experts 
 Novice students  Advanced students  Experts 
 No code  Code  No code  Code   
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Correct total warrants 2.42 1.62  1.83 1.12  1.42 1.00  2.92 1.44  3.42 1.62 
Correct total backings  .50  .80  1.50 1.73   .50  .79  1.00 1.71  1.67 1.37 
Correct total rebuttals  .17  .39   .08  .30   .08  .29   .42  .79   .33  .49 
Correct total conclusions 1.50 1.62  2.17  .72  1.25 1.36  2.33 1.23  2.33 1.37 
Correct total elements 4.58 3.60  5.58 2.99  3.25 2.53  6.67 4.66  7.75 3.75 
 
 Reasoning process. Contrary to our expectations, a planned contrast showed no 
significant differences between students and experts on regulation activities: t (55) = 
-.91, ns, and execution activities: t (55) = -.12, ns. The fact that experts and students 
did not differ significantly with regard to their problem solving processes (as the 
studies of Lundeberg, 1987, and Oates, 2006, would suggest), might also be a conse-
quence of not being allowed to use information sources, which may have interfered 
with their usual approach to problem solving.  
Effects of availability of an information source on students’ reasoning 
 Accuracy of reasoning. In line with our hypothesis, planned contrasts showed 
that advanced students who could use the civil code were significantly more accu-
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rate than advanced students who could not use the civil code, t (55) = -2.33, p < .05, 
d = .13, whereas no significant difference was found for novices t (55) = -.74, ns. 
 We hypothesized that this would happen, because novices would not profit 
from the civil code since their lack of conceptual knowledge influences not only 
their interpretation of the case, but also their ability to use the civil code effectively. 
It could also be that novices lack knowledge of how the civil code is organized (e.g., 
were to find the right articles?, what does the numeration mean? etc.), or it might be 
a combination of both. The following examples of protocol excerpts nicely illustrate 
this. 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of reasoning process scores of novice students, advanced 
students and experts 
 Novice students  Advanced students  Experts 
 No code  Code  No code  Code   
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Mean total protocol 
elements 
33.00 18.17  50.83 21.05  30.67 10.65  46.25 25.63  36.92 15.06 
Total number regula-
tive phases 
14.75 8.76  34.25 13.31  17.42  9.47  28.67 23.90  20.75 11.52 
Total number execu-
tive phases 
18.25 11.54  16.58 11.41  13.25  4.69  17.58 10.98  16.17  9.24 
Orientation (reg) 11.08 8.63  24.25 10.10  11.42  6.75  20.33 16.99  15.33  8.91 
Monitoring (reg)   .92 .52   4.33  3.23    .92  1.17   3.33  3.47   2.25  2.63 
Planning (reg)  2.08 1.38   3.92  1.78   3.25  2.53   3.33  3.31   1.92  2.02 
Evaluation (reg)   .67 .49   1.75  2.49   1.83  1.34   1.67  1.72   1.25  1.42 
Elaboration (exe) 11.25 6.90  10.25  8.60   8.42  3.66  11.33  7.38   9.58  5.47 
Concluding (exe)  7.00 4.99   6.33  3.55   4.83  1.70   6.25  4.00   6.58  4.44 
 
 An example from an advanced student, who was not allowed to use the civil 
code, illustrates that without using the code, difficulties arise in reasoning about the 
right of reclamation ‘The right of reclamation . . . , well I do not know by heart what it 
exactly means . . . if I had the possibility to search in the civil code I would first look to at the 
period of limitation. . . . ’ The following example from a novice who could not use the 
civil code, seems similar, except that the advanced student is more specific in what 
(s)he would look for in the code: ‘Oh no, I do not know what the definition of the right of 
retention is . . . I do not know what ownership exactly encompasses . . . I actually need a civil 
code to search for it . . . ’. So both novice and advanced students indicate they need the 
code. However, when the civil code is available, the following example illustrates 
what happens when a novice starts searching for information, in this case also con-
cerning the right of retention: ‘ The right of retention, hmm, I will look immediately at 
article 8. 945, hmm lets see 8. 945, I will go back. . hmm the code jumps from article 910 
directly to 7, I first see article 908 and then 7.1 hmmm ok, that is not what I am looking for .  
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   This novice seems to experience problems finding the right information; (s)he 
does not know exactly what information (s)he is looking for and where it can be 
found. This is in marked contrast to the following excerpt from the protocol of an 
advanced student who could use the civil code, which illustrates that (s)he could 
not only find the right information regarding the right of reclamation, but could 
also link the information from the civil code to the information in the case regarding 
the claim: ‘In this case Mr D has the right of reclamation because the civil code says: ‘that 
the owner of an object has the authority to claim the object from every person who keeps the 
object without permission’ . . . ’ 
 Reasoning process. It was found that novices who could use the civil code made 
significantly more regulative comments, t (55) = -3.30, p <.05, d = 1.73. than novices 
who could not use the civil code. This finding is probably due to the (ineffective) 
search processes in the civil code, and reflects ‘negative’ remarks concerning regula-
tion (e.g., ‘I cannot find what I am looking for’). The following excerpt from a novice 
with the civil code illustrates that using the code leads to regulation even if the stu-
dent has difficulties understanding the formal information: ‘First I will search in the 
civil code what specifically is said about the right of retention, let’s see hmm, ok, here it is 
said: ‘The right of retention means the authority, indicated by law, the creditor has to post-
pone the fulfilment of obligation until the claim is paid by the debtor’ . . . well ok hmm, what 
does this all mean . . . ?’ Contrary to our expectations, there were no significant differ-
ences between advanced students who could and could not use the civil code both 
on regulation activities: t (55) = -1.90, ns, and execution activities: t (55) = -1.07, ns. So 
even though advanced students were able to benefit from the availability of the civil 
code in terms of accuracy, this did not seem to affect the amount of engagement in 
general reasoning processes, although it must have influenced the content. 
Conclusions and implications 
This study investigated the effects of the availability of conceptual knowledge on 
legal reasoning by comparing the accuracy and process of reasoning of students and 
experts when they could only rely on their knowledge. It was found that experts 
performed better than students, but that their performance was still rather low. This 
study provides an indication of the extent to which experts depend on information 
sources when reasoning about cases. They do not only seem to need such sources 
for substantiating conclusions, but also for working towards conclusions. 
 Next, we investigated the effects of the availability of the civil code on the accu-
racy and process of novice and advanced students’ legal reasoning. As we hypothe-
sized, the availability of the civil code improved legal reasoning for advanced stu-
dents, but not for novice students. Lack of conceptual knowledge and lack of know-
ledge of how information sources are organized, both by themselves or in combina-
tion, indeed seemed to lead to ineffective search processes when using the informa-
tion sources. Such processes impose a high additional and ineffective (i.e., extrane-
ous) load on working memory, that is, this load is not imposed by processes that 
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contribute to the quality of the task performance (for a discussion of cognitive load 
theory, see Sweller et al., 1998; Van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005). 
 The findings strongly suggest that current instructional methods for novice 
students in law school are suboptimal. Law education relies heavily on the idea that 
students learn to reason about -and to solve- cases by engaging in solving cases 
(with the aid of external sources) from very early on in their trajectory. However, 
the results from the current study suggest that novices may learn very little from 
this form of instruction, that is, their performance does not seem to improve from 
being allowed to use the civil code compared to not having an information source 
available at all. Therefore, novice law students might need different forms of in-
struction, or more instructional guidance to help them learn to solve cases more 
effectively. Research on scaffolding or fading instructional guidance has shown that 
providing high levels of support initially (e.g., by reducing the amount of search 
required through the use of worked examples or by other means) and then slowly 
fading this out with increasing student expertise/knowledge, makes the learning 
process more effective and efficient (see e.g., Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller 
2003; McNeill, Lizotte, Krajcik, & Marx, 2006; Renkl & Atkinson, 2003; Van Gog, 
Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2008). Future studies should investigate whether forms of 
instructional guidance, such as scaffolding conceptual knowledge, or diminishing 
the additional cognitive load imposed by the search process in the civil code (e.g., 
by giving students not a full, but a condensed version containing only relevant in-
formation), are more effective and efficient for novices than the ‘traditional’ method 
of instruction. Concerning scaffolding of conceptual knowledge, an important ques-
tion is what the most optimal technique would be, and the answer likely depends 
on the type of concepts as well. It may be that providing the students with the defi-
nition of concepts suffices, however, the meaning of some legal concepts may vary 
according to the context (Lindahl, 2004; see also Nievelstein et al., 2008, Chapter 2), 
and learning these may therefore depend on repeated encounters with the concept 
in several different contexts and cases. In this case one might consider annotating 
concept definitions in different cases and requiring students to make comparisons 
between the meaning of the concepts in the cases. 
 It is impossible to imagine the law profession without the availability of exter-
nal information sources, yet this study showed that the influence of these sources -
and learning how to use them- on legal reasoning should not be underestimated. 
There is a difference between the way the profession is practiced and the way nov-
ices should be taught to become a practitioner in the domain. Even though the ap-
proaches to solving legal cases differ in Common law and Civil law, the current 
findings may also apply to the Common law system. Conceptual knowledge plays 
an equally important role in Common law, and even though the information 
sources used may differ (e.g., documented jurisprudence) the ineffectiveness of 
search processes when using these sources may not be that different. However, it 
would be interesting to test this in future studies. 
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Appendix - Private law case 
 
 
‘The Sailing Boat’ 
Mister Schip (S) exploits a boat garaging. In a harbour lies the pilot of mister 
Schip of which he is the owner. March 1999, a wooden sailing boat (from now: 
the boat) is stolen from mister Duinstra (D). Mister D reported this theft by the 
police. September 2000, an unknown person requested mister S to store a boat 
in his pilot; S accepted and garaged the boat in his garaging. At the end of June, 
mister D sees by accident that his boat is stored in mister S’ garaging, and he let 
S know that he is the owner of the boat. D requests S to hand over the boat. S is 
willing to do this on condition that D pays the garaging costs. D refused. July, 
25th 2004, D reported his discovery by the police. August the 1st 2004, the police 
attached the boat and mister S is questioned as suspect of the theft by the police. 
October 30th 2004, the public prosecutor decided that the boat must be returned 
back to mister D. Then this occurred. The criminal case against S is dismissed by 
the public prosecutor because of insufficient valid evidence. December the 6th 
2004, mister D is summoned by mister S to appear in court. On the one hand, he 
claimed mister D to hand over the boat to him (S), on the other hand, conviction 
of D primary to pay the amount of € 3600, and secondary to a reasonable 
amount of finders’ reward. Finally, S claims D in order to pay the legal costs. S 
founded this claim by stating that he has a right of action mattering the garag-
ing costs of the boat as well as right of retention on the basis of which he has 
right to reclaim the boat. 
 
How would you handle the case if you were mister D’s lawyer? 
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Despite differences in law systems between countries, a common approach to teaching stu-
dents to reason about cases, is ‘learning by doing,’ that is, reasoning about lots of cases re-
peatedly with the aid of external sources professionals also use. However, reasoning about 
legal cases is a complex skill to acquire, and there are indications that this essential aspect of 
teaching law is less than optimal, especially for novice students. Two experiments are pre-
sented here that show that instructional support can improve students’ learning to solve 
cases. Experiment 1 investigated the effect of supporting novices by targeting their lack of 
conceptual knowledge necessary for reasoning about cases (i.e., providing meaning of con-
cepts), by reducing the cognitive load imposed by search processes (i.e., providing a con-
densed code), or both. Reducing the amount of search required during learning led to higher 
performance on a test case. Experiment 2 investigated the effects of supporting reasoning 
itself through an outline of process-steps and of worked examples, for novices and advanced 
students. Studying worked examples substantially increased performance on a test case for 
both novices and advanced students. 
  
Irrespective of their legal specialization (e.g., solicitor, judge, public prosecutor, 
legal advisor), reasoning about cases is probably the most important activity for 
professionals in the domain of law (Blasi, 1995; Lundeberg, 1987; Stratman, 2002; 
Williams, 1992). Almost daily, they solve problems and make decisions founded on 
legal rules and documented previous decisions of the court (i.e., jurisprudence/court 
judgments; Blasi, 1995). In Civil (European-Continental) law, the primary sources of 
jurisdiction are documented laws, whereas court judgments are used to a lesser 
degree. Jurisdiction in Common (Anglo-Saxon) law is more grounded on court 
judgments, whereas documented laws are secondary sources. The backbone of vir-
tually all law school curricula, regardless of the exact educational formats used (e.g., 
lectures, self-study assignments, collaborative learning assignments, tutorials, moot 
courts; on which different law schools place different emphasis, Teich, 1986) is that 
learning to reason about cases is held to be best acquired through ‘learning by do-
ing’, that is, by engaging in solving many cases with the aid of information sources 
professionals can also use (see Sullivan, Colby, Welch-Wegner, Bond, & Shulman, 
2007; Vranken, 2006; Williams, 1992). 
 Instructional design research has shown, however, that ‘learning by doing’ is 
not the most effective nor efficient way of knowledge and skill acquisition, rather, 
students (especially novices) often learn better and faster with instructional formats 
that provide more support or guidance (Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). 
However, studies on the effects of instructional support have thus far mainly fo-
cused on more structured domains (e.g., math or science problems) and it has been 
argued that it is unclear whether these findings would also apply to more complex, 
that is, less structured or ill-structured domains such as law (Rourke & Sweller, 
2009; Schmidt, Loyens, Van Gog, & Paas, 2007). 
 Research in the legal domain has suggested that a ‘learning by doing’ approach 
to acquiring reasoning skill entails serious problems for students, especially novices, 
as they lack knowledge of the formal legal language, which is necessary to under-
stand and reason about cases (Blasi, 1995; Deegan, 1995; Lindahl, 2004; Nievelstein, 
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Van Gog, Boshuizen, & Prins, 2008, Chapter 2). Moreover, effective use of informa-
tion sources not only requires knowledge of how the source is organized, but also 
relies to a large extent on knowledge of the formal legal language. A study by 
Nievelstein, Van Gog, Boshuizen, and Prins (in press, Chapter 3) has indeed shown 
that novice students’ performance on a case did not improve by using a civil code 
compared to a situation where they did not have a civil code at their disposal. Ad-
vanced students did, however, perform better when they could use the code, as one 
would expect. This suggests that novice law students may need a different kind of 
instructional approach -one that involves more support- for learning to reason 
about cases. Two experiments are presented here that investigate this assumption. 
Before describing these experiments, we will first address some of the difficulties 
students encounter in learning law in more detail. 
Complexity of the legal domain 
Reasoning about law cases is a complex task that encompasses the integration of 
different interrelated information elements and the coordination of different cogni-
tive processes during several stages of problem solving. For example, students have 
to read cases, formulate questions, search for applicable laws and provisions, check 
whether rules and provisions can be applied to the case, and finally, provide con-
vincing, substantive argumentation to those questions (Blasi, 1995; Sullivan et al., 
2007). In integrating and coordinating those different processes, conceptual knowl-
edge plays a pivotal role. Knowledge of relevant legal concepts is required to un-
derstand the case and to frame the problem in the correct legal context (Deegan, 
1995; Lindahl, 2004). Furthermore, to determine the most relevant information in the 
case, what the underlying legal framework is, and which laws might therefore be 
most applicable, students should know the formal meaning of legal concepts (Lun-
deberg, 1987; Sullivan et al., 2007; Vranken, 2006). Two complications arise here. 
First, students are often hindered by intuitive, everyday ideas about many concepts 
when they start to study law, which need to be changed into formal meanings (Lin-
dahl, 2004; Lundeberg, 1987; Nievelstein et al., 2008, Chapter 2; similar problems 
also occur in other domains, for example in physics, see Chi, 2005; Vosniadou, 
1994). Second, the meaning of some concepts varies with the context of the case. 
That is, in a different context, the same concept can have other implications (Lin-
dahl, 2003; Vranken, 2006). An example, is the concept ‘property’ that does not al-
ways have the same implication (Vervoordeldonk, 2006). Depending on the context, 
it can mean a tangible object, or it can imply the right of ownership. Therefore, the 
context of the case in which concepts are embedded is important to abstract their 
exact meaning. 
 Another difficulty is related to the need to identify potentially applicable laws 
to the case which also requires searching in external information sources such as 
law books or legal databases containing court judgments. The use of such external 
sources plays an important role in this profession because lawyers need to exactly 
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qualify and verify possible applicable laws and/or court judgments to single cases. 
The importance of this strict qualification and verification is to achieve equality, 
generalisation, repeatability, and predictability of jurisdiction (Vranken, 2006). 
Again, conceptual knowledge is important to understand the information found. 
However, to be able to search effectively, knowledge of the organization and index-
ing of the information source is also required. Knowledge about the organization of 
the Dutch civil code, for example, would be knowing that the code starts with gen-
eral and ends with particular provisions, that it consists of one part related to ‘per-
sons’ (i.e., law of persons) and one part related to ‘properties’ (i.e., law of property), 
et cetera. This kind of knowledge might reduce the search space, but novices usu-
ally also lack this. In sum, while searching through sources, not only the informa-
tion in the case and the information searched for should be kept in mind, but the 
information that is found also needs to be interpreted in light of the case informa-
tion and/or in light of other laws or court judgments referred to in the source. 
 Finally, reasoning about a case requires that students substantiate arguments 
convincingly, and to do so, they also need to consider possible counterarguments 
from opposing positions. This is necessary because of the adversarial nature of the 
legal domain: different parties (i.e., lawyer, judge, public prosecutor, legal advisor) 
have different interests and therefore different perspectives on the same case (Tha-
gard, 1992). 
Expertise development and instruction 
Learning can be seen as the acquisition, elaboration, and/or reorganization of cogni-
tive schemas (Boshuizen, 2004; Chi, Glaser, & Farr, 1988; Schank & Abelson, 1977; 
Sweller, 1988). Schemas combine related information elements into one single ele-
ment and have two important functions in the process of learning and problem 
solving (see e.g., Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992, 2008; Sweller, 1988). First, they facili-
tate storage and organization of knowledge in long term memory, and second, they 
also facilitate information processing in working memory during problem solving 
and learning. When learning new skills, the number of new information elements 
that can simultaneously be processed in working memory is limited (Cowan, 2001; 
Miller, 1956). The number of new, inter-related information elements a task con-
tains, determines the cognitive load it imposes on working memory (see for reviews 
of cognitive load theory: Sweller et al., 1998), because a schema can be treated as a 
single element in working memory, and it can serve as a framework for processing 
new information. Available schemas, therefore, reduce the load imposed on work-
ing memory (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008; Sweller, 1988). Moreover, sometimes 
schemas can be automated through practice, in which case working memory load is 
further reduced because such schemas no longer require controlled, effortful proc-
essing (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). 
 Whether or not schemas can be automated, depends on their nature. As men-
tioned before, law is a complex cognitive domain. Complex cognitive tasks require 
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the coordination and integration of multiple, inter-related constituent skills, and 
these constituent skills can be either recurrent (or routine) or non-recurrent (or non-
routine; Van Merriënboer & Kirschner, 2007). Recurrent constituent skills rely on 
algorithmic, rule-based behaviour after training. They are associated with routine 
task aspects that typically have a narrow problem space, and correct application of a 
particular set of operators associated with a problem type always leads to a correct 
solution. Therefore, problem solving performance can be automated as a result of a 
lot of practice, because appropriate problem solving operators can relatively easily 
be recognized and distinguished from inappropriate ones. Non-recurrent constitu-
ent task aspects on the other hand, are associated with non-routine task aspects, 
meaning they have to be performed in varying ways across problem situations, and 
therefore one needs a strategy to narrow the search space and select those operators 
that are most likely to lead to a solution (e.g., heuristics). 
 However, even though they cannot be fully automated, experts can perform 
non-recurrent task aspects far more effectively and efficiently than non-experts as a 
result of their high-quality, well-structured schemas. With developing expertise, 
schemas become more elaborated, refined, and integrated with other schemas, mak-
ing them better accessible during problem solving, but novice students’ knowledge 
is limited, fragmented and not yet organized (see e.g., Boshuizen, 2004; Boshuizen & 
Schmidt, 1992, 2008; Custers, Boshuizen, & Schmidt, 1998). Because they have yet to 
develop memory structures that contain rich networks of concepts, and specify 
significant relationships between those concepts, novices have difficulties to inter-
pret, evaluate, integrate and combine new information elements. As a consequence, 
complex cognitive tasks such as reasoning about legal cases require them to rely on 
sub-optimal strategies, such as means-ends analysis (i.e., analyzing differences be-
tween the current problem state and the goal state to choose operators that can re-
duce the differences). Although this might be a good strategy to solve an unknown 
problem (i.e., performance), it poses very high load on working memory and does not 
seem to contribute much to learning (Sweller, 1988; Sweller et al., 1998). 
 In sum, given the complexity of the domain and its consequence for learning 
and expertise development, it can be questioned whether ‘learning by doing’ is the 
most optimal instructional strategy for learning to reason about legal cases. Novice 
law students are presumably seriously hampered by their lack of knowledge of the 
formal legal concepts and problem solving schemas, which play such a pivotal role 
in interpreting the case information, searching in information sources, determining 
the underlying legal framework, identifying applicable laws, looking for counterex-
amples, and substantiating arguments convincingly (Deegan, 1995; Lindahl, 2004; 
Lundeberg, 1987; Sullivan et al., 2007). 
 This suggests that novices need additional instructional support when engaging 
in reasoning about cases to enhance their learning. Such support can be targeted at 
different processes. The first experiment investigates support focused on conceptual 
knowledge and the use of an external information source. The second experiment 
investigates support focussed on the entire reasoning process, by means of general 
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process-steps and worked examples. Both experiments are conducted in a Civil 
(European Continental) law context in the field of private law. 
Experiment 1 
The findings of Nievelstein et al. (2008, Chapter 2) and Nievelstein et al. (in press, 
Chapter 3) showed that novices have difficulties with reasoning about legal cases 
because of their lack of knowledge -and everyday interpretation- of legal concepts, 
and that novices were not able to take advantage of a civil code: their performance 
did not improve compared to not having any information other than the case de-
scription at their disposal. However, it is unclear from these findings whether (1) 
lack of conceptual knowledge hinders students’ understanding of the case, the un-
derlying legal framework, and the external source, or whether (2) the search process 
in the external source itself -while keeping in mind the relevant case information- 
imposes an ineffective load on working memory and as a result, hinders learning, or 
(3) -most likely- whether it is an interplay of those two possible causes. Therefore, 
this first experiment investigates whether learning to solve cases is improved by a) 
providing novice law students with explanations of the meaning of relevant formal 
concepts (e.g., ‘purchase’, ‘owner’, and ‘hire agreement’) along with the case de-
scription, which would help them to make sense of the case information, and b) 
reducing the search space in the civil code by providing learners with only the arti-
cles that represent the rules of law of the code (i.e., condensed civil code) that need 
to be used when solving the cases we presented. If lack of correct conceptual 
knowledge leads to learning difficulties, because novices have difficulties under-
standing and abstracting the relevant case information and the underlying legal 
framework, the instructional format in which concept explanations are added to the 
case would be expected to lead to better learning. If, however, the extensive search 
space -caused by a complete civil code- causes the learning difficulties, because it 
imposes high ineffective load (i.e., extraneous cognitive load) on working memory, 
the instructional format in which students can use a condensed civil code would be 
expected to lead to better learning. If both lack of conceptual knowledge and the 
ineffective load imposed by the search process are the cause, a combination of pro-
viding both concept explanations and condensed civil code would be expected to lead to 
better learning. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-nine first-year law students from a Dutch university volunteered to partici-
pate in this study. They were novices on the topic of private law (i.e., they had not 
yet started with the introductory course on civil law). For their participation, stu-
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dents received a financial compensation of €10 and a small amount of course credit 
on a written exam. 
Design 
 A 2 x 2 factorial design with the factors Concept Explanations (Yes/No) and 
Civil Code (Condensed/Complete) was used. This leads to four conditions: ‘Concept 
Explanations – Condensed Civil Code’ (n = 20), ‘Concept Explanations – Complete 
Civil Code’ (n = 20), ‘No Concept Explanations – Condensed Civil Code’ (n = 20), 
and ‘No Concept Explanations – Complete Civil Code’ (n = 19). 
Materials 
 Electronic experimental environment. All materials (a pre-test, a post-test, two 
learning tasks, one test task, and mental effort rating scales) were presented in a 
web-based electronic experimental environment. The environment logged partici-
pants’ responses and time-on-task. 
 Pre-test and post-test of conceptual knowledge. A pre-test and post-test were used to 
measure conceptual knowledge before and after the experiment. The tests consisted 
of the 21 concepts (e.g., ‘owner’, ‘transfer of property’, and ‘gift’) that were also used 
in the problem description of the learning tasks and test task. Students were re-
quired to give their definition of the concepts, or to mark ‘I do not know’ if they did 
not know the meaning of a concept. 
 Learning tasks. The learning tasks consisted of two civil law cases with the same 
underlying theme, namely ownership and transfer of property, but with different 
contexts. The context of transfer of property (i.e., a pair of skis) in the first learning 
task had the sequence of hire – sell – gift. That is, person A hired a pair of skis from 
person X, then sold the skis to person B, who in turn gave the skis to person C as a 
present. The context of transfer of property (i.e., high-pressure pistol) in the second 
learning task had the sequence of hire – gift – gift. That is, person A hired the high-
pressure pistol from person X, gave the pistol to person B as a present, who in turn, 
gave the pistol to person C as a present. The learning tasks appeared in text on the 
computer screen. Below the learning tasks was a typing window in which students 
were required to write their argumentation about who became owner of the object 
after the transfer of the skis and the high pressure pistol, respectively. There was no 
limitation on the number of characters that could be typed in this window. The 
complete civil code consisted of the civil code collection of Dutch legislation. The 
condensed civil code consisted of only those articles participants needed -twelve in 
total- in order to solve the cases, copied on seven pages of A4 paper. The concept 
explanations concerned the same 21 concepts that appeared in the pre-test and post-
test. In the concept explanation conditions, definitions of the concept were pre-
sented on the right side of the computer screen next to the learning task and were 
visible continuously until the task was completed. 
 Test task. The test task consisted of a case that was again about ownership and 
transfer of property, but the context of transfer of property (i.e., a scooter) in this test 
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task had the sequence of hire – gift – sell. That is, person A hired a scooter from 
person X, gave the scooter to person B as a present, who in turn, sold the scooter to 
person C. It was presented in text on the computer screen, with a typing window 
below the task, in which students were required to write their argumentation about 
who became owner of the object after the transfer of the scooter. Concept explana-
tions were no longer provided and all participants had to use the complete civil 
code. 
 Mental effort rating scale. Invested mental effort was measured using the 9-point 
subjective rating scale developed by Paas (1992). The scale ranged from very, very 
low mental effort (1) to very, very high mental effort (9). This scale is a reliable measure 
of actual cognitive load (i.e, the cognitive capacity that is actually allocated to ac-
commodate the demands imposed by the task) and is sensitive to variations in task 
complexity between and within tasks (see Van Gog & Paas, 2008). 
Procedure 
The experiment was run in two-hour group sessions with approximately 20 stu-
dents per session in a computer room at the law school. In each session, participants 
were randomly assigned to conditions (i.e., conditions were not tied to sessions), by 
having the experiment leader randomly hand out login codes that ascribed partici-
pants to one of the four conditions. With login codes that applied to the condensed 
civil code condition, participants also received a version of the condensed code. The 
other students were told to use their copy of the complete code, which all partici-
pants had been asked to bring along. The students worked individually at their own 
pace. Students first received a short oral explanation about the experimental proce-
dure. They were instructed to log on to the electronic learning environment and told 
to follow the directions on the screen. All students first completed the pre-test. 
Then, all students worked on the same two learning tasks one after another, with or 
without the support of the concept explanations and with the instruction to either 
use the complete or the condensed civil code, depending on their assigned condi-
tion. Before starting the test task, students in the condensed civil code condition had 
to hand in the condensed code to the experiment leader, and students in all condi-
tions were instructed to use their complete civil code during the test task. After 
completing the test task, they received the post-test. Students had to mark how 
much mental effort they invested in the pre-test, in each learning task, in the test 
task, and in the post-test on the 9-point rating scale that appeared on the computer 
screen directly after completion of each of those tests or tasks. After rating the men-
tal effort on the post-test, participants were automatically logged out of the system. 
Data analysis 
Concept definitions provided in the pre-test and post-test were rated according to 
their formal definitions in a Dutch legal dictionary (Algra et al., 2000). The formal 
Manuscript_FleurieNievels_v07.pdf   66 24-7-2009   10:01:53
 66 
definitions of the concepts consisted of either one, two, or three parts. For each of 
these parts correctly mentioned, one point was assigned. A total of 34 points could 
be gained. 
 Performance on the test task was analysed according to a scoring model devel-
oped by a private law professor, comparable to the models used to score examina-
tions. The weight (number of points to be gained) ascribed to each argument, de-
pended on the importance of the argument to reach the correct solution. In total 100 
points could be gained. 
Results 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of the performance, mental 
effort, and time on task data per condition. For the analyses reported here, Cohen’s f 
is provided as a measure of effect size with .10, .25, and .40, corresponding to small, 
medium, and large effects, respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
 Due to a server connection failure, pre-test data of eleven participants were not 
logged (i.e., ‘Concept Explanations – Condensed Civil Code’ n = 4, ‘Concept Expla-
nations – Complete Civil Code’ n = 1, ‘No Concept explanations – Condensed Civil 
Code’ n = 3, and ‘No Concept Explanations – Complete Civil Code’ n = 3), those 
participants were excluded from the pre-test analysis. A one-way ANOVA showed 
no significant differences between groups on the pre-test F(3,64) = 1.19, p > .20, so 
students in the different conditions did not differ on prior knowledge of concepts. 
 Test performance. A 2 x 2 ANOVA with factors ‘Concept Explanations’ and 
‘Condensed Civil Code’ showed a significant main effect of ‘Condensed Civil Code’ 
on test task performance F(1,75) = 15.46, MSE = 147.01, p < .001, f = .11, indicating 
that students who had used the condensed code during the learning phase (M = 
23.37, SD = 14.42) scored better on the test (using the complete code) than students 
who had used the complete code during learning (M = 12.74, SD = 9.67). There was 
no significant main effect of ‘Concept Explanations’, F(1,75) = 3.40, MSE = 147.01, p = 
.069, nor a significant interaction effect, F(1,75) = 0.97, MSE = 147.01, p > .20. 
 Knowledge gain. Due to a server connection failure, the post-test data from eight 
participants were lost (i.e., ‘Concept Explanations – Condensed Civil Code’ n = 3, 
‘No Concept Explanations – Condensed Civil Code’ n = 2, and ‘No Concept Expla-
nations – Complete Civil Code’ n = 3). Combined with the lost pre-test data (i.e., for 
some students pre-test data and for others post-test data was lost, and for some 
students both), pre- to post-test knowledge gain could be computed for 65 partici-
pants. A 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the factors ‘Concept Explanations and ‘Condensed 
Civil Code’ only showed a significant main effect of ‘Concept Explanations’ on pre- 
to post-test knowledge gain, F(1,61) = 56.01, MSE = 9.58 p < .001, f = .94, indicating 
that students who had received the concept explanation during the learning phase 
(M = 7.06, SD = 3.81) scored better on the test than students who had not been given 
the explanations (M = 1.25, SD = 2.11).  
Manuscript_FleurieNievels_v07.pdf   67 24-7-2009   10:01:53
Chapter 4 
Effects of instructional support 
 67 
 Mental effort. A 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the factors ‘Concept Explanations’ and 
‘Condensed Civil Code’ showed no significant differences in mental effort invested 
in any of the experimental phases (pre-test: all F(3,64) < 1; learning tasks: all F(3,75) 
<1; test task: all F(3,75) < 1; conceptual knowledge post-test: all F(3,67) < 1). 
 Time on task. A 2 x 2 ANOVA, with the factors ‘Concept Explanations’ and 
‘Condensed Civil Code’ showed no significant differences (pre-test: all F(3,64) < 1; 
learning tasks: all F(3,75) <1; test task: all F(3,75) < 1; conceptual knowledge post-
test: all F(3,67) < 1).  
Table 1. Means and standard deviations of performance, mental effort, and time on task in experi-
ment 1 
 Concepts and 
Condensed Code 
 Concepts  Condensed Code  No support 
 M SD  M SD  M SD  M SD 
Pre-test performance  
  max. 34  
   9.50   3.46     7.68   1.95    9.24   3.65     8.38   3.54 
Mental effort pre-test  
  max. 9  
  5.42    .77     5.65    .933    5.40   1.13     5.05   1.47 
Time on pre-test  
  sec.  
1014.95 635.40   625.90 218.22  871.70 487.94  1024.58 716.86 
Mental effort training  
  max. 9  
   5.45   1.33     5.90   1.12    5.68   1.41     5.71   1.40 
Time on training phase  
  sec.  
 780.85 247.23  1007.37 237.97  960.03 481.51   832.21 466.79 
Performance test task  
  max. 100  
  24.55  13.88    16.50  10.72   22.20  15.21     8.79   6.61 
Mental effort test task  
  max. 9 
   5.40   1.23     5.70   1.26    5.85   1.60     5.74   1.37 
Time on test phase  
  sec.  
 638.25 297.23   478.55 176.59  839.55 492.58   377.32 188.39 
Post-test performance  
  max.34  
  16.24   4.52    14.65   3.83   11.00   3.66     9.06   3.96 
Mental effort post-test  
  max. 9  
   4.89   1.24     5.30   1.08    5.21   1.13     5.41   1.28 
Time on post-test  
  sec.  
 498.85 269.48   519.65 201.21  579.10 293.69   505.26 280.55 
Pre- post-test gain  
  max. 34 
   6.57   3.63     7.42   3.99    1.82  2.33      .60   1.68 
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Discussion 
This experiment investigated whether novice (first-year) law students’ learning was 
enhanced by providing them with instructional support consisting of concept ex-
planations, a condensed civil code, or both, while solving cases. Performance on a 
test case under normal conditions was improved when students made use of a con-
densed civil code (i.e., containing only those articles necessary in order to solve the 
case) during the learning phase. This finding suggests that reducing the required 
search space enables students to learn better. Rather than losing precious cognitive 
resources on searching through large amounts of information (i.e., ineffective cogni-
tive load), students’ attention can be entirely devoted to making sense of the rele-
vant information in the code in relation to the case (i.e., effective cognitive load). 
Note that these students had to use the complete code (i.e., normal situation) on the 
test task. It seems that if students learn in what kind of situations (i.e., situations 
containing similar structural features) specific rules should be applied, their search 
process in a complete civil code becomes more efficient because they have learned 
what they should search for and where. 
 Providing students with concept explanations led to better knowledge of those 
concepts (higher pre- to post-test gain), which means that students in the concept 
explanations condition did attend to this type of support; they learned (i.e., were 
able to recall) the meaning of concepts. But apparently, this did not affect their per-
formance on the test case, possibly, because deeper understanding of the underlying 
legal framework such as the implications of the rights and duties implied by con-
cepts as ‘gift’, ‘owner’ and ‘hire agreement’, was not attained. This finding suggests 
that this form of support may be interesting for law education, as students’ acquisi-
tion of conceptual knowledge can be enhanced by presenting concept definitions 
along with cases, but concept definitions are not sufficient to enhance students’ 
learning to solve cases. 
 The results on perceived mental effort during the training and test tasks did not 
differ between the groups. However, it is important to regard mental effort data in 
light of performance data; the same amount of mental effort invested during train-
ing and test resulted in higher test performance in the condensed code condition, so 
the cognitive processes in which the effort was invested were more useful for learn-
ing and test performance in this condition than in the other conditions (Van Gog & 
Paas, 2008). In other words, the performance benefits that appeared on the test task, 
were obtained with the same amount of mental effort invested during the learning 
phase and during the test, indicating higher efficiency of this condition in terms of 
both the learning process and in terms of the quality of learning outcomes (see Van 
Gog & Paas, 2008, for a discussion of both types of efficiency). 
 These findings show that learning to solve cases with a condensed civil code 
leads to better performance under ‘normal’ conditions (i.e., in which the complete 
civil code has to be used). However, if we look at the average test performance sco-
res in this group, it seems that there is still a lot of room for improvement. This may 
be because the interventions studied here were only focused on support at the con-
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ceptual level and on the search process level, not on the reasoning process itself. 
Students may profit from a form of support that not only helps them to see which 
articles in the civil code are relevant to apply to a specific case, but also why those 
articles are relevant (i.e., what is the underlying legal framework) and how they can 
be applied, because argumentation plays an important role in reasoning about cases 
(cf. Deegan, 1995; Lundeberg, 1987). Good argumentation is not only necessary to 
persuade and convince others, but also to formulate a defence in such a way that 
there is no room left for others to rebut arguments. Therefore, experiment 2 focuses 
on support for the reasoning process. 
Experiment 2 
Reasoning can be supported in several ways, for example, by worked examples, 
flow charts, process-steps, or decision support systems. In well-structured domains, 
a number of effective instructional formats have been identified that fully or par-
tially show what specific problem solving steps should be taken (and sometimes how 
or why these steps should be performed), such as worked examples (e.g., Sweller & 
Cooper, 1985), process-oriented worked examples (Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriën-
boer, 2006, 2008) or completion problems (i.e., partially worked examples with 
blanks for the learner to complete; Paas, 1992). These formats prevent students’ use 
of weak problem-solving strategies and lower the ineffective load on working me-
mory, allowing them to direct all their cognitive resources towards studying and 
constructing a cognitive schema of a good problem solution. As such, these instruc-
tional formats are alternatives to ‘learning by doing’. In the current experiment it is 
investigated whether the findings in less complex domains also apply to complex 
domains, such as law. We provided students with two different forms of support: 
process-steps and worked examples. The process-steps provided in this experiment 
provide students with a general set of steps to be taken in case solving. In this ex-
periment, two student groups were included. Not only novices (first-year), but also 
advanced (third-year) students participated, for reasons we will explain below. 
Process-Steps 
Process-steps provided students with a set of generic steps to guide their reasoning 
about the case, derived from Toulmin’s model of argument (Toulmin, Rieke, & 
Janik, 1984): grounds, warrants, backings, rebuttals, qualifiers, and conclusion(s), which 
can be taken to structure arguments in such a way that important assumptions, 
evidence, and exceptions of a case can be made explicit. In solving a legal case, a 
lawyer must first distinguish and extract the legally relevant facts (grounds) from the 
case information. Based on the relevant facts, applicable sources of law referred to 
as warrants (e.g., rules of law and statutes) have to be identified, along with possible 
additional information like a reference to generally accepted knowledge, norms or 
court judgments, which can strengthen the warrant (i.e., backings). These warrants 
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and backings have to be compared to the grounds to test whether rules are indeed 
applicable to these facts. Applicable rules of law have to be placed in a specific se-
quence in which the more specific rules will be tested after the more general rules 
have proven valid. Rebuttals are information elements from the case that are excep-
tions on rules, and the qualifier reflects the probability of a legally correct conclusion 
on the basis of the available grounds, warrants, backings and rebuttals. The final 
conclusion (i.e., judgment) should be drawn, consisting of that which, based on 
available information, can be asserted. 
 In an experiment performed by Carr (2003), second year law students were 
either supported with Toulmin’s argumentation process-steps or received no sup-
port at all while formulating arguments about cases. It was assumed that the group 
of students supported with those steps would formulate arguments of higher qual-
ity on a final exam. The results, however, showed no significant differences between 
the groups. These findings might indicate that Carr’s second-year students did not 
yet have the necessary level of domain knowledge to formulate high quality argu-
ments based on their prior knowledge and that, as a result, these process-steps are 
not a very effective type of support for them. Findings by Van Gog et al. (2006) also 
showed that for novice students, providing them only with a description of a sys-
tematic approach to problem solving did not improve their learning compared to 
problem solving without any support. 
 However, the effects of process-steps as a function of expertise have not yet 
been explored, and for students who have sufficient prior knowledge, process-steps 
might be an appropriate form of support. 
Worked examples 
In contrast to the general process-steps, worked examples present students with 
fully worked-out steps. A worked-example consists of descriptions of the initial 
problem formulation, the goal state, and the solution steps to be taken to reach the 
goal state -and in case of process-oriented examples, also information on how and 
why those steps were selected (Van Gog et al., 2006, 2008). Research has shown that 
for novices, learning by studying worked examples is more effective and efficient 
than learning by solving the same problems themselves (see for reviews Atkinson, 
Derry, Renkl, & Wortham, 2000; Renkl, 2005; Sweller et al., 1998). Sweller et al. at-
tributed this to the fact that novices can only rely on generic problem-solving strate-
gies such as means-ends analysis, which impose a high load on working memory 
and do not contribute to learning. By providing them with worked-out problem 
solutions to study, learners’ attention can be fully devoted to building a schema for 
how the problem should be solved (i.e., learning). Worked examples can also en-
hance transfer, when learners not only learn to apply the demonstrated solution 
procedure, but also understand it, so that they are able to flexibly apply (parts of) it 
in solving novel problems (Mayer & Wittrock, 1996). 
 Worked examples have proven effective for schema acquisition in several do-
mains, but it should be noted that these were primarily domains that are highly 
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structured such as mathematics (e.g., Gerjets, Scheiter, & Catrambone, 2006; Große 
& Renkl, 2006; Paas, 1992; Sweller & Cooper, 1985), geometry (e.g., Paas & Van Mer-
riënboer, 1994; Schwonke, Renkl, Krieg, Wittwer, Aleven, & Salden, 2009), or phys-
ics (e.g., Reisslein, Atkinson, Seeling, & Reisslein, 2006; Van Gog et al., 2006, 2008). 
Few studies have addressed effects of worked examples in more ill-structured do-
mains such as learning to recognize designer styles (Rourke & Sweller, 2009), learn-
ing to collaboratively diagnose a patient and design a treatment plan (Rummel & 
Spada, 2005), and learning argumentation skills (Schworm & Renkl, 2007). 
 Research using highly structured tasks, has shown that worked examples are 
not effective for all students. The phenomenon known as the ‘expertise reversal 
effect’ (Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003) indicates that instruction consist-
ing of studying worked examples improves novices’ learning and transfer, but is 
ineffective for or can even hamper learning of advanced students who have prior 
knowledge of the task. Kalyuga et al. concluded that the information provided by 
worked examples can be redundant for advanced students, that means, once they 
have acquired a schema for solving that problem, studying a solution procedure is 
unnecessary and may even interfere with their own schema for solving that prob-
lem. However, Schmidt et al. (2007) suggested that findings concerning high levels 
of instructional guidance obtained in well-structured domains, might not necessar-
ily apply to ill-structured domains. The studies by Rourke and Sweller (2009), Rum-
mel and Spada (2005), and Schworm and Renkl (2007) suggest, however, that wor-
ked examples may also be effective with less structured tasks. In addition; the find-
ings by Rourke and Sweller also suggested that in more complex domains, ad-
vanced students might still benefit from examples. This may also be the case in the 
legal domain, as the findings by Nievelstein et al. (in press, Chapter 3) suggested 
that even though third-year students performed much better than novices and 
could profit from the use of a civil code, they still had a lot of room for improve-
ment. However, if the expertise reversal effect would apply, it may be counterpro-
ductive for advanced students to learn with fully worked examples, because the 
examples might interfere with their existing schemas, and as a result, might hamper 
learning (Kalyuga et al., 2003). 
 In sum, this experiment was designed to investigate whether novices’ and ad-
vanced law students’ reasoning about cases will improve when, during the learning 
phase, they are presented with worked examples to study rather than with the same 
cases to solve themselves, and/or with process-steps derived from Toulmin’s model 
of argument (Toulmin et al., 1984) that describe a systematic generic approach to 
solving cases. It is hypothesized that novices would learn most if they were sup-
ported with worked examples (either with or without process-steps being made 
explicit as well) because they lack the necessary knowledge to solve cases, whereas 
advanced students might either also benefit from studying worked examples (cf. 
Rourke & Sweller, 2009), or, if the findings concerning the expertise reversal effect 
(Kalyuga et al., 2003) apply, then the process-steps, which provide more generic 
guidance, might be the best form of support for advanced students. 
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Method 
Participants 
Seventy-five first-year law students and 36 third-year law students from a Dutch 
university volunteered to participate in this study. All first-year students were nov-
ices on the topic of private law (i.e., they had not yet started with the introductory 
course on this topic). The third-year students had completed several courses on 
private law. For their participation, first-year students received a financial compen-
sation of €10 and a small amount of course credit on a written exam. Third-year 
students received a financial compensation of €30. 
Design 
A 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design with the factors Worked Examples (Yes/No), Process-
steps (Yes/No) and Student Expertise (Novice –first-year/Advanced –third-year) 
was used. As a result, at each student expertise level, there were four conditions: 
‘Worked Examples – Process-steps’ (first-year, n = 19; third-year, n = 9), ‘Problem 
Solving – Process-steps’ (first-year, n = 19; third-year, n = 9), ‘Worked Examples – 
No Process-steps’ (first-year, n = 19; third-year, n = 9), and ‘Problem Solving – No 
Process-steps’ (first-year, n = 18; third-year, n = 9). 
Materials 
 Electronic experimental environment. As in experiment 1. 
 Prior knowledge test. The pre-test used in experiment 1, was used as a prior 
knowledge test here that served the purpose to check whether random assignment 
was successful in ruling out prior knowledge differences between conditions and 
whether advanced students indeed had more prior knowledge than novices. 
 Learning tasks. The learning tasks were identical to those used in experiment 1; 
they consisted of two civil law cases at a level of difficulty appropriate for first-year 
students, with the same underlying theme (ownership and transfer of property) but 
different contexts. The learning tasks appeared in text on the computer screen. In 
the process-steps conditions, five generic steps (i.e., grounds, warrants, backings, re-
buttals and conclusion) that should be taken to reason about a case according to 
Toulmin’s Model of Argument (Toulmin et al., 1984) were listed in the instructional 
text above the case, and were presented in diagrammatic form beside the case. Par-
ticipants received the instruction to substantiate the case according to those five 
steps. In the worked examples conditions, a worked-out step-by-step argumentation 
according to the steps of Toulmin’s model was provided of the case, with the in-
struction to carefully study the worked examples and to try to understand why 
these problem solving solutions were applied to the case. In the process-steps and 
problem-solving condition (i.e., control condition), a typing window was presented 
in which students had to write their argumentation. There was no limitation on the 
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number of characters that could be typed in this window, and students could use 
the Dutch civil code. 
 In the combined condition, the process-steps were explicitly mentioned in the 
worked examples (whereas in the examples only condition, they were only implic-
itly present). 
 Test task. As in experiment 1. 
 Mental effort rating scale. As in experiment 1. 
Procedure 
Two-hour group sessions with maximally 20 participants per session (divided over 
different conditions) were scheduled in a computer room at the law school. In each 
session, participants were randomly assigned to conditions, by having the experi-
ment leader randomly hand out login codes that ascribed participants to one of the 
four conditions. Participants first received a short oral explanation about the proce-
dure. Then, they were instructed to log on to the electronic learning environment 
and follow the directions on the screen. They could work at their own pace. All 
participants first completed the pre-test. Then they received the two learning tasks 
either with or without process-steps and with or without a worked-out solution, 
depending on their assigned condition. After completing the learning tasks, they 
worked on the test task. Participants were allowed to use the civil code during the 
learning and test tasks. After each learning task and the test task, they rated their 
perceived amount of invested mental effort. After they had filled out the last mental 
effort rating scale, participants were automatically logged out of the system. 
Data analysis 
Performance on the prior knowledge test and the test case was determined as in 
experiment 1. 
Results 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations of the first-year students’ per-
formance scores, mental effort ratings, and time on task. Table 3 presents the same 
data for third-year students. For all analyses reported here, Cohen’s f is provided as 
a measure of effect size with .10, .25, and .40, corresponding to small, medium, and 
large effects, respectively (Cohen, 1988). 
Prior knowledge 
An ANOVA showed that there were no differences between conditions in prior 
knowledge for the first-year students, F(3,65) < 1 (six participants were not included 
in this analysis because their prior knowledge test data were lost due to a server 
connection failure; i.e., ‘Worked Examples – Process-steps’ n = 1, ‘Problem Solving – 
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Process-steps’ n = 3, ‘Worked Examples – No Process-steps’ n = 1, and ‘Problem 
Solving – No Process-steps’ n = 1). Neither were there significant differences on 
prior knowledge between conditions for the third-year students, F(3,30) < 1 (data of 
two participants were not logged due to a server connection failure; i.e., ‘Worked 
Examples – Process-steps’ n = 1, ‘Problem Solving – Process-steps’ n = 1). However, 
as expected, a t-test showed that third-year students (M = 17,12, SD = 3,13) had sig-
nificantly more prior knowledge than first-year students (M = 8,86, SD = 2,85), t(101) 
= -13,39, p < .01, Cohen’s d = 2.75 (equal to f = 1.38). 
Test performance 
Time spent on the learning tasks differed significantly among the different condi-
tions and will therefore be treated as covariate in this analysis. A 2 x 2 x 2 ANCOVA 
with factors: ‘Worked Examples’, ‘Process-steps’, and ‘Student Expertise’, on test 
task performance, with learning time as covariate, showed a significant main effect 
of ‘Student Expertise’ F(1,102), MSE = 425.62, p < .001, f = .40, indicating that third-
year students (M = 59.67, SD = 32.12) significantly outperformed first-year students 
(M = 34.76, SD = 31.64) on the test task. Also a significant main effect was found for 
‘Worked Examples’ F(1,102), MSE = 425.62, p < .001, f = .97, indicating that students 
supported with worked examples during the learning phase, performed signifi-
cantly better on the test task (first-year: M = 58.63, SD = 27.73; third-year: M = 82.28, 
SD = 18.11) than students supported with process-steps (first-year: M = 10.24, SD = 
6,93; third-year: M = 37.06, SD = 26.71). There was also a significant interaction effect 
of ‘Worked Examples’ and ‘Process-steps’, F(1,102), MSE = 425.62, p < .05, f = .50, 
indicating that for both first-year- and third-year students, support by process-steps 
alone led to low performance whereas support by process-steps in combination 
with worked examples led to high performance. 
Mental effort 
A 2 x 2 x 2 ANCOVA with factors: ‘Worked Examples’, ‘Process-steps’, and ‘Student 
Expertise’ with learning time as covariate, on mental effort during the pre-test, 
showed that third-year students had to invest significantly less mental effort (M = 
4.68, SD = 1.30) than first year students (M = 5.58, SD = 1.04), F(1,102) , MSE = 1.26, p 
< .001, f = .37, but there were no significant main effects of ‘Worked Examples’ 
F(1,102) = .23, p > .20, or ‘Process-steps’ F(1,102) = 3.26, p = .74, nor an interaction 
F(1,102) = .30, p > .20. 
 On the learning tasks, third-year students invested significantly less mental 
effort (M = 4.46, SD = 1.52) than first-year students (M = 5.75, SD = 1.41), F(1,102), 
MSE = 1.88, p < .001, f = .44. A main effect of ‘Worked Examples’ on mental effort 
invested in the learning phase was found, indicating that students who studied 
worked examples had to invest less mental effort (first-year: M = 5.25, SD = 1.04; 
third-year: M = 4.08, SD = 1.06) in the learning tasks than students supported with 
process-steps (first-year: M = 6.27, SD = 1.55; third-year: M = 4.83, SD = 1.83), 
F(1,102), MSE = 1.88, p < .01, f = .30.  
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 On the test task, third-year students reported significantly less mental effort (M 
= 4.61, SD = 1.50) than first-year students (M = 5.88, SD = 1.47), F(1,102), MSE = 2.25 p 
< .001, f = .43, but there were no significant main effects of ‘Worked Examples’ 
F(1,102) = .05,p > .20, or ‘Process-steps’ F(1,102) = 1.67, p > .20, nor an interaction 
F(1,102) = 2.04, p > .2 
Table 2. Means and standard deviations of first-year students’ performance, mental effort, and time 
on task in experiment 2 
 Examples and 
Process-steps  
Examples  Process-steps No support 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Pre-test performance  
  max. = 34  
   9.39   2.28    8.19   3.25    9.00   3.31   8.76   2.59 
Mental effort pre-test  
  max. = 9 
   5.42    .92    5.74   1.05    5.53   1.12   5.67   1.19 
Time on pre-test  
  sec. 
 868.00 484.07  929.21 643.13  918.79 723.38 736.94 453.679 
Mental effort training  
  max. = 9 
  5.34   1.11    5.16   1.00    6.66   1.65   5.86   1.37 
Time on training phase  
  sec.  
 589.37 256.27  547.58 200.18 1560.26 622.57 831.58 337.64 
Performance test task  
  max. = 100 
  59.58  31.42   57.68  24.34    9.53   6.42  11.00   7.54 
Mental effort test task  
  max. = 9 
   5.68   1.16    6.05   1.62    6.05   1.87   5.72   1.18 
Time on test phase  
  sec. 
1717.16 724.00 1780.68 617.54  411.68 175.39 494.89 165.10 
 
Comparative Analysis Experiment 1 and 2 
Because the same learning and test tasks were used in experiment 1 and 2, and nov-
ice participants in both experiments were students from the same cohort, it is possi-
ble to compare the factor that led to the best test performance in experiment 1 (Con-
densed Code) with the factor that led to the best performance in experiment 2 
(Worked Examples). A comparison of Tables 1 and 2 suggests that learning from 
worked examples is more effective than learning with a condensed civil code. A t-
test confirmed this: studying worked examples led to significantly better perform-
ance, than support provided by the condensed civil code, t(37) = -5.49, p < .01, d = 
1.75. There were no significant differences on invested mental effort during learn-
ing, t(37) = 1.32, p > .10 or on the test, t(37) = -.39, p >.10. 
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Table 3. Means and standard deviations of third-year students’ performance, mental effort, and 
time on task in experiment 2 
 Examples and 
Process-steps 
Examples  Process-steps No support 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Pre-test performance  
max. = 34  
17.00 2.14 17.25 4.06 17.00 3.78 17.22 2.77 
Mental effort pre-test  
max. = 9 
4.78 1.12 5.22 1.09 4.00 1.50 5.00 1.23 
Time on pre-test  
sec.  
796.00 292.06 1078.78 399.19 964.78 396.66 1101.33 344.26 
Mental effort training  
max. = 9 
4.22 1.03 3.94 1.13 4.44 2.34 5.22 1.15 
Time on training phase  
sec. 
443.83 187.39 410.89 142.09 1101.33 364.40 849.83 334.99 
Performance test task  
max. = 100  
86.00 18.59 78.56 17.89 27.78 29.03 46.33 21.89 
Mental effort test task  
max. = 9 
4.44 1.33 4.67 1.50 4.22 1.92 5.11 1.27 
Time on test phase  
sec. 
1540.89 653.18 1956.56 573.30 628.56 365.69 659.33 194.839 
 
Discussion 
This second experiment investigated whether providing first- and third-year stu-
dents with instructional support consisting of worked examples, process-steps, or 
both, during learning, led to better reasoning about this type of cases as measured 
by performance on a test task. 
 In line with our hypothesis, first-year students performed best on the test case 
when they had studied worked examples during the learning phase. Moreover, 
despite their higher level of expertise as corroborated by their higher prior knowl-
edge scores, learning task performance (i.e., in the problem-solving conditions), 
higher test performance, and their lower mental effort ratings, the same applied to 
third-year students. The finding that studying worked examples leads to better test 
performance than process-steps or problem solving with less mental effort invested 
during learning, replicates that of other studies (e.g., Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994; 
Van Gog et al., 2006), but in contrast to some other studies we found no differences 
between conditions in mental effort invested during the test task (e.g., Paas, 1992; 
Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1994). Nonetheless, these findings indicate that studying 
worked examples was more efficient in terms of the learning process (higher test 
performance with lower investment of effort during learning) and in terms of the 
quality of learning outcomes (higher test performance with equal investment of 
effort in the test; see Van Gog & Paas, 2008). 
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 Providing students only with process-steps to be taken, did not improve their 
learning. On the contrary, it had disadvantageous effects on performance when only 
the steps were given (i.e., not combined with a worked example). This suggests that 
this is not an effective way of providing guidance. A possible explanation is that the 
process-steps interfere with learning because students try to use them but are not 
able to do so effectively because they need to find out for themselves what they 
have to do at those steps and why. 
General discussion 
The experiments presented here investigated the effects of different types of instruc-
tional support on acquisition of a complex cognitive skill: learning to solve legal 
cases. This skill plays a pivotal role in the legal profession, and regardless of 
whether a law school’s curriculum is more focused on formal lectures, tutorials, 
group collaboration, self-study, or a combination of those, students usually are 
taught to reason about cases in a ‘learning by doing’ manner, that is, by engaging in 
reasoning about many cases with the aid of law books and/or court judgments. 
Research suggested that this is not the most optimal way of teaching this skill (e.g., 
Nievelstein et al., in press, Chapter 3), and that students, especially novices, might 
need higher levels of instructional support. 
 Experiment 1 showed that students’ performance improved when they were 
supported with a condensed civil code. Using a condensed code reduces the 
amount of search and the need to keep the case information that inspired the search 
in mind. It also reduces the need to have knowledge about how such codes are or-
ganized, that is, knowledge about where information can be found. Thus, a con-
densed code presumably reduced ineffective load on working memory, and as a 
consequence, students could devote more cognitive resources to understanding the 
information presented in the code and linking this information to the case, than 
students who had to use the complete civil code. On the test case, all students had to 
use the complete code, which posed no problems for the students who learned with 
the condensed code, presumably because they had learned which articles could be 
applied to the same kind of problem, and were therefore able to conduct a more 
directed search for the relevant articles in the complete code. Although it led to 
higher conceptual knowledge gain, there was no effect of providing concept expla-
nations on reasoning performance, possibly because the meaning of each single 
concept was given without any further information about the relationship(s) with 
other concepts and its implication(s) in this specific context. An interesting question 
for future studies would be to investigate whether a concept map that also shows 
the significant relationship(s) between those concepts would be more effective than 
a list of concepts. 
 Experiment 2 showed that both first-year students’ and third-year students’ 
performance improved when they learned by studying worked examples. From 
these results, it can be concluded that instructional formats that provide more sup-
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port or guidance are also effective in more complex domains (cf. Rourke & Sweller, 
2009) and that the suggestion by Schmidt et al. (2007), that findings on instructional 
support on structured tasks might not necessarily apply to more complex tasks, 
seems to be incorrect. Our data even suggest that in complex domains, instructional 
support remains valuable even for advanced students. In a way, this makes sense, 
because when a domain is ill-structured, it becomes harder or may take longer to 
reach an expert level (cf. Custers et al., 1998). That is, tasks in complex domains are 
characterized by a high number of non-recurrent (or non-routine) task aspects (Van 
Merriënboer & Kirschner, 2007), and acquiring expertise in such domains requires 
not only obtaining experience in a high number of different contexts but also proc-
esses of verifying, integrating, and changing knowledge, to build rich knowledge 
bases. In more structured domains, tasks contain more recurrent (routine) elements, 
which, once learned, can be applied similarly across tasks, and therefore, expertise 
can be developed faster. 
 A comparison of the Condensed Civil Code (without Concept Explanations) 
and the Worked Example (without Process-steps) conditions from experiments 1 
and 2 showed that a high level of instructional support consisting of studying 
worked examples was more effective than the use of a condensed civil code. This is 
probably a result of the fact that worked examples provide the most comprehensive 
type of support for learning to reason about cases. 
 In interpreting these findings, it should be noted that the experiments presented 
here also have some limitations. First of all, the support types were studied in an 
experimental session of relatively short duration in which students were trained 
with only two successive cases on a single underlying legal framework. Therefore, it 
remains unclear whether these support types remain effective after a delay, whether 
they are viable in courses of longer duration, and whether transfer of learning might 
occur to cases with different underlying frameworks. Secondly, these experiments 
were conducted in Civil (European-Continental) law where documented laws are 
the primary sources of jurisdiction, and reasoning is mainly rule-based. This means 
the findings presented here may not necessarily apply in Common (Anglo-Saxon) 
law, where documented court judgments are the primary sources of jurisdiction and 
reasoning is more case-based (by analogy). However, despite these differences, the 
underlying reasons for why the support is effective might not be that different (e.g., 
searching through databases with jurisdiction may also impose a high cognitive 
load when little knowledge is available of how it is organized or how to interpret 
the information found) and similar types of support might also be effective in 
Common law. 
 Despite these limitations, these experiments may have some interesting theo-
retical and practical implications, and suggest interesting directions for future re-
search. As discussed above, these findings support the notion that instructional 
support is also effective in complex domains, and our second experiment even sug-
gests that an expertise reversal effect may not occur -or at least not as rapidly- in 
complex domains. Implementing a heavier reliance on worked examples in curric-
ula may be interesting for law educators, because it not only leads to better learning 
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outcomes, but may also have the effect that the learning trajectory becomes more 
efficient. Not only in the cognitive sense already discussed (i.e., in terms of students’ 
required effort investment), but also in the sense that education that is better tai-
lored to learners’ needs, may require less time (cf. Zhu & Simon, 1987), thereby 
allowing learners to progress faster and/or leaving time for deeper elaboration of 
topics. In implementing a heavier reliance on worked examples in the curriculum 
though, it is important to note that research in highly structured domains has 
shown that instructional support needs to be high initially and should then be 
gradually decreased, or faded out (e.g., by providing students with completion 
problems, that is, partly worked examples with an increasing number of blanks for 
the student to complete; Paas 1992), followed by solving problems without any 
support in the end (see Renkl & Atkinson, 2003). There is no reason to assume that 
this completion or fading strategy would not apply in more complex (i.e., less struc-
tured) domains, but the findings of the second experiment suggest that the dynam-
ics (e.g., timing) of this fading principle may be different in more complex domains 
such as law, which is an interesting question for future research. 
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Addendum 
Worked examples implemented in a law course 
The experiments described in Chapter 4 show the promise of instructional support 
for ameliorating the difficulties students experience in learning to reason about 
cases. However, experiments are highly controlled and of short duration, and an 
important question is whether these effects can also be found in more ecologically 
valid settings. The following field study suggests they do. 
 In 2008, the Faculty of Law at Tilburg University implemented worked exam-
ples in a four-week course on property law taught to first-year students (novices). 
Contrary to the method used in the foregoing years in which students had to solve 
one case every week that was elaborately discussed during the tutorial, their prac-
tice was now divided into three phases. Every course week, students were obliged 
to study a worked example of a case with a particular underlying legal framework 
in an electronic learning environment. After studying the case, the students had to 
solve a case with the same underlying legal structure as the worked example them-
selves. The solution of that case was given during the weekly tutorial meeting in 
which a law teacher discussed the content and the steps towards the solution with 
the students. In total, 392 students attended the official examination, comparable to 
the number of students in foregoing years. The examination consisted of four parts. 
In the first part, students had to solve a case that had the same underlying structure 
as one worked example that had been studied during the tutorial (retention). In the 
second part, students again had to solve a case, but here students had to combine 
and integrate several different aspects they had studied separately by means of 
several worked examples -but not in combination with each other- during tutorials 
(transfer). The third and the fourth part required knowledge reproduction of theory 
literally mentioned in books and formal lectures. In total, 51% of the students pas-
sed the official exam (i.e., 200 students). The percentage of students who passed a 
similar official exam on property law in 2007, was 35%. Four weeks after the official 
examination, students who failed could try again (a re-examination) and 97 students 
(about 30 students less compared to foregoing years, which is logical considering 
the higher success rate on the initial exam) attended this re-examination, and 36% of 
them passed, compared to 26% the year before. 
 Of course, these results have to be interpreted with care, as it cannot be ruled 
out based on the available data that this cohort was not in other ways different from 
the previous year, but nonetheless, it seems that worked examples are an effective 
way of enhancing learning when applied in law curricula. 
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In this final chapter, the main findings of the studies reported in this dissertation are 
summarized and discussed in terms of conclusions and theoretical implications. In 
addition, practical implications and directions for future research are discussed. 
Discussion of main findings 
Learning to reason about cases implies constructing cognitive schemas that incorpo-
rate the knowledge and skills required to guide future solving of cases. The general 
process of reasoning about cases consists of a) determining the underlying legal 
framework, b) identifying applicable laws, rules, and court judgments, c) searching 
for counterexamples, and d) substantiating arguments convincingly (cf. Blasi, 1995). 
However, the current way of teaching students how to solve legal cases (i.e., by 
having them solve lots of cases) does not optimally contribute to schema develop-
ment4 
 The main aim of this dissertation was to gain insight in the kind of difficulties 
students with different levels of expertise encounter when they learn to reason 
about cases, as well as to investigate the effects of different kinds of instructional 
support on reasoning performance. Chapter 1 presented data from an interview 
conducted with law students and teachers, which showed that learning to reason 
about law cases entails several difficulties for students. The difficulties students 
experience can be mainly related to characteristics of this complex domain, which 
make it difficult to acquire expertise in legal reasoning: acquisition of conceptual 
knowledge and ontology, the use of external sources, and adversarial reasoning. 
With regard to conceptual knowledge and ontology, the findings from Chapter 2 
show that students -not surprisingly, especially novice students- lack correct con-
ceptual knowledge, which is also characterized by the fact that they mainly use 
everyday language to describe concepts. Moreover, there were large differences 
among students, showing a lack of ontology (i.e., shared and agreed upon explicit 
meaning). In addition, it was found that increasing expertise is characterized by the 
ability to activate different schemas with regard to intermediate concepts (i.e., 
owner). Such concepts that do not have one single, fixed meaning but their function 
varies depending on the context (Lindahl, 2004; Vranken, 2006). Not only experts, 
but also advanced students were more accurate than novices in their elaborations of 
such a concept. These findings are important, because conceptual and ontological 
knowledge is necessary for correct classification of problems and tasks, as well as 
for communication and argumentation in the domain . 
 With regard to the use of external information sources, Chapter 3 showed that 
the normal way of practice, that is, with the availability of a civil code, had positive 
effects on reasoning only for advanced students, but not for novice students. These 
results demonstrate that conceptual knowledge and knowledge of external sources 
                                                             
4 This does not mean that students do not learn at all from engaging in solving many cases, just that they 
do not learn as much as quickly as they might with other kinds of practice. 
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are important for solving cases. Interestingly, it was also found that without the 
availability of the code, experts’ performance on reasoning about a case that should 
have been relatively easy for them, was rather low. In this respect, the legal domain 
seems to differ from other domains such as medicine or engineering, because pro-
fessionals always need to refer to external information sources, not only to substan-
tiate conclusions, but also for working towards conclusions by identifying specific 
rules and/or court judgments. The possibility to consult external sources at any time 
prevents them from the need to learn the endless number of rules, court judgments, 
and counterexamples by heart, which is not only time consuming, but also almost 
impossible to do. 
 Building on the findings from Chapters 2 and 3 regarding students’ conceptual 
knowledge and use of the civil code, the first experiment presented in Chapter 4 
investigated the effects on learning of providing students with additional support, 
by giving them concept explanations along the case, a condensed civil code contain-
ing only relevant articles rather than the entire code, or both. Students who had 
received the concept explanations did not perform better on reasoning about a test 
case. They did, however, gain conceptual knowledge. The condensed civil code did 
positively affect novices’ performance on reasoning about the test case. Nonetheless, 
there was still a lot of room for improvement, presumably because concept explana-
tions and condensed codes alleviate difficulties experienced by students, but they 
do not support the entire reasoning process. The second experiment in Chapter 4 
investigated two interventions that were assumed to support the reasoning process, 
by means of process-steps, worked examples, or both. Studying worked examples 
substantially increased performance on the test case for both novices and advanced 
students. It seems that schema development is effectively supported by providing 
students with examples to study that show elaborations on the meaning and impli-
cation of concepts -especially intermediate concepts-, for the use of external sources 
and the reasoning process itself. As the Addendum to Chapter 4 shows, positive 
effects of studying worked examples on students’ reasoning were also found in a 
real first-year law school course on property law. 
 The finding that worked examples were also effective for advanced students, 
has interesting theoretical implications. The effects of instructional support and 
guidance have thus far mainly been studied in more structured domains, in which it 
has been found that an expertise reversal effect occurs once students have some 
prior knowledge of a task, meaning that for instance, worked examples are effective 
for novices’ learning compared to problem solving, but they lose their effectiveness 
once students have some prior knowledge, in which case problem solving becomes 
more effective (see Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003). The advanced stu-
dents in this study did have more prior knowledge than the novice students, and 
outperformed them. Nonetheless, the advanced students still benefitted from study-
ing worked examples, which suggests that the interaction between instructional 
support and students’ level of expertise is different in complex domains. This may 
also have consequences for instructional strategies based on the expertise reversal 
effect, such as a completion or fading strategy (see Renkl & Atkinson, 2003), in 
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which the amount of instructional support is gradually decreased (see the next sec-
tion on ‘practical implications’ for a more detailed discussion). 
Practical implications 
The findings from the interview reported in Chapter 1, combined with the findings 
from the studies in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, suggest that law teachers are well advised 
to not rely as heavily on ‘learning by doing’, but rather provide students with more 
instructional support. One prevalent misconception among educators is that ‘learn-
ing by doing’ best prepares students for real practical, authentic situations. How-
ever, it is important to take into account students’ expertise level when designing 
learning tasks. One cannot expect novice students to perform well in authentic, real 
life situations, because they have not yet acquired the skill to do so. Moreover, it can 
be questioned to what extent ‘learning by doing’ really resembles actual practical 
situations, in which there can be a hectic atmosphere at some moments, the pressure 
of deadlines, interaction with real (and sometimes stressed, or frustrated) clients, 
and where case judgments have actual personal or financial consequences. These 
circumstances are not practiced via the kind of ‘learning by doing’ implemented in 
law schools. Gaining expertise on those important skills, requires actual experience 
in the field in which students need to see many different cases under different cir-
cumstances (Sullivan et al., 2007; Vranken, 2006). How students can best learn to 
perform a task and how that task is performed in practice are two different things, 
and the studies discussed here show that more support is beneficial for learning. 
 The experiments in Chapter 4 showed first of all that adding concept explana-
tions did help students to learn the meaning of concepts. Even though this did not 
affect their reasoning performance within the time-course of this experiment, stu-
dents might acquire conceptual knowledge faster if they receive annotated cases 
that contain concept explanations in law school. Second, novices’ reasoning did 
improve from using a condensed civil code, which is again, a relatively simple ma-
nipulation that could be implemented in educational practice. Third, providing 
students with process-steps was not effective for learning. It seems that providing 
students with only the steps they should take, does not help much, because they 
should still find out what to do exactly (see also findings by Muntjewerff, 2001). 
Finally, of the four types of instructional support studied in this dissertation, wor-
ked examples led to the highest learning gains. The field study described in the 
addendum to Chapter 4 suggests that a heavier reliance on studying worked exam-
ples can be successfully implemented in law school curricula. According to faculty 
members involved in this field study, the students were very positive about the 
worked examples. They said the examples helped them because the underlying 
framework was made clear and they felt they understood better why certain steps 
should be taken in a certain context. 
 A heavier reliance on studying worked examples in law school courses might 
lead to higher efficiency, not only for students, in the sense that better performance 
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is obtained with equal or less mental effort investment than through solving cases 
without further support (Paas & Van Merriënboer, 1993; Van Gog & Paas, 2008), but 
also for teachers, in the sense that education with a heavier reliance on examples is 
better tailored to learners’ needs and may therefore require less time (cf. Zhu & 
Simon, 1987), thereby allowing learners to progress faster and/or leaving time for 
deeper elaboration of topics. In implementing a heavier reliance on worked exam-
ples in the curriculum though, it is important to note that research in highly struc-
tured domains has shown that instructional support needs to be high initially and 
should then be gradually decreased, or faded out (e.g., by providing students with 
completion problems, that is, partly worked examples with an increasing number of 
blanks for the student to complete; Paas 1992), followed by solving problems with-
out any support in the end (see e.g., Atkinson, Renkl, & Merrill, 2003; Renkl & At-
kinson, 2003). There is no reason to assume that this so-called completion or fading 
strategy would not apply in more complex domains, but the findings of the second 
experiment described in Chapter 4 suggest that the dynamics (e.g., timing) of this 
fading principle may be different in more complex domains such as law, because 
schema construction becomes harder or may take longer in complex domains as it 
requires the integration of different kinds of knowledge and skills (cf. Ericsson, 
2006). This would be interesting to investigate in future experimental or practical 
research, along with several other questions discussed in the next section. 
Future research 
The studies reported in Chapter 4 are promising first steps towards alternative in-
structional formats that help alleviate the difficulties law students’ experience in 
acquiring legal reasoning skills. However, a number of questions also remain for 
future research on law education. 
 First of all, the results from Chapter 2 suggest it might be interesting to look into 
the efficiency of teacher-student and student-student communication processes. 
Lack of overlapping knowledge (ontology) might complicate communication be-
tween students, which could be a problem in a collaborative learning setting, and 
differences in ontology might complicate communication between experts (teachers 
and professionals) and students. For example, research on expert-laypeople com-
munication has shown that experts often experience difficulties with accurately 
estimating novices’ level of knowledge, and adapting their explanations to that level 
(Bromme, Rambow, & Nückles, 2001; Nückles, Wittwer, & Renkl, 2005). Although 
law teachers should be trained in recognizing students’ knowledge level and adapt-
ing to that, university teachers in particular are also domain experts. The teacher-
student communication process might benefit from providing teachers with tools to 
accurately assess the level of conceptual knowledge development of their students 
may (cf. Bromme et al., 2001; Nückles et al., 2005). 
 Secondly, the studies described in Chapter 4 addressed the effects of instruc-
tional formats with higher degrees of support mainly in a self-study context (or 
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combined with a lecture after studying the example, as in the field study). Future 
research might focus on instructional formats that provide more support or guid-
ance to students in other educational settings, such as in lectures or tutorials (e.g., a 
teacher or tutor working out an example) or in collaborative learning settings. Other 
variables may come into play under such conditions that may affect learning out-
comes compared to self-study conditions. For example, motivation or pacing may 
become an issue when a teacher works out an example (e.g., the pace of a teacher 
working out an example during a lecture may be too fast or too slow for students to 
follow along), and group learning requires coordination processes that impose an 
additional cognitive load which may or may not be effective for learning (cf. Kir-
schner, Paas, & Kirschner, 2009). 
 Third, in contrast to the techniques applied in the studies in Chapters 2 and 3, 
the studies in Chapter 4 relied mainly on performance and cognitive load measures 
to draw conclusions about differences in acquired cognitive schemas. It might be 
interesting to use process-tracing techniques such as verbal reporting (Ericsson & 
Simon, 1993), concept mapping (Kane & Trochim, 2006), or eye-tracking (Du-
chowski, 2003), either alone or in combination, to explore in more detail how the 
content or structure of the schemas students have acquired in response to different 
types of support differs, as well as how they use these schemas in reasoning about 
new tasks. Uncovering such information could also lead to the development of 
other or more refined types of instructional support, and sometimes these tech-
niques themselves may even be applied as a kind of instructional support (see Van 
Gog, Kester, Nievelstein, Giesbers, & Paas, 2009). For example, concept mapping 
might assist students in learning to understand the different functions of intermedi-
ate concepts (cf. science education: Roth, 1990; Van Boxtel, Van der Linden & Kanse-
laar, 2000). 
 Fourth, only four possible types of instructional support were investigated in 
this dissertation, all focussing on reasoning about a case in private law. Other types 
of support and support for other types of tasks in the legal domain are possible. For 
example, Hummel, Nadolski, and colleagues studied the effectiveness of presenting 
students with process worksheets during (specific phases of) learning how to pre-
pare a plea (Hummel, Paas, & Koper, 2004; Nadolski, Kirschner, & Van Merriën-
boer, 2005). The process worksheets divided the problem of how to prepare a plea 
in several steps and guided the students by questions at each step. Both studies 
suggested that process worksheets may have beneficial effects on learning how to 
prepare a plea. The findings by Nadolski et al. suggested, however, that the number 
of steps in which the process worksheet is divided may play a crucial role. Too few 
steps may hardly provide any guidance at all and result in cognitive overload, 
whereas too many steps may lead to redundancy. In their study, an intermediate 
number of steps proved best, however, this benefit applied only to the learning 
process, not to learning outcomes. They did not, however, study a possible interac-
tion with students’ expertise levels. 
 Fifth, the types of support that were investigated here did not explicitly focus 
on one of the difficulties identified in Chapter 1, that is, adversarial reasoning. This 
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did implicitly play a role in the worked examples, but was not explicitly addressed. 
Future research could, for instance, study another type of worked examples explic-
itly directed at conveying adversarial reasoning skills by working out different per-
spectives -and as a logical result- the different implications of those perspectives on 
the same case. (cf. Chi, Roy, & Hausmann, 2008, who showed students examples of 
another student being tutored, which had a positive effect on students who ob-
served the examples, i.e., without them being tutored themselves). By means of such 
examples, the steps taken by someone with role A and the possible (coun-
ter)arguments on those steps by someone with role B can be made explicit by pro-
viding information on what (counter)arguments can be made, and how and why 
these are good or bad arguments or can be rebutted. Another viable line of research 
on instructional support for adversarial reasoning would be to continue and extend 
the work by Ashley and Aleven (1991) on cognitive tutors that pose questions such 
as ‘identify and assess possible counterexamples to rebut’, monitor students’ solu-
tion steps and provide feedback to support students with formulating more persua-
sive arguments. 
 Finally, the studies reviewed here were conducted in a Civil law context. Even 
though there is no reason to assume that heavier reliance on for instance worked 
examples or condensed information sources would not be effective in Common law 
as well, the systems do rely on different types of reasoning, and the information 
sources used in Common law are different. Even though the role of conceptual 
knowledge and the ineffectiveness of search processes when using these other in-
formation sources may not be that different in Common law, it would be interesting 
to investigate whether or not different kinds of support yield similar effects in that 
context. 
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Summary 
  
One of the main aims of law education in both the Civil (European-Continental) law 
and Common (Anglo-Saxon) law systems is to teach students to reason about cases. 
As reviewed in Chapter 1, students experience serious difficulties in learning to 
reason about cases, which seem to arise from the complexity of the domain, the way 
in which knowledge is acquired in complex domains, as well as the instructional 
approach widely used in law schools. This approach often consists of ‘learning by 
doing’, which means that students have to reason about lots of cases throughout 
their study by using information sources that professionals also use. The studies 
presented in Chapters 2 to 4 were designed to gain more insight in the kind of diffi-
culties and the underlying causes that students with differing levels of expertise 
have when they learn to reason about cases in law school, as well as to investigate 
the requirements for effective instructional approaches that provide more support 
and might help to diminish or overcome the experienced difficulties. 
 Chapter 2 describes a study in which conceptual knowledge and ontological 
knowledge of 24 first-year students (novices), 24 third-year students (advanced), 
and 12 law faculty (experts) specializing in private law in the Civil law system was 
investigated, using a card-sorting task and a concept-elaboration task. The card 
sorting task consisted of 30different concepts, printed on separate cards, that were 
all in some way related to one main concept in private law: ‘tort’. Participants were 
instructed to group the 30 concepts in such a way that the concepts in one group 
had stronger relations with each other than with concepts in other groups. While 
doing so, they had to verbalize aloud why they put specific concepts together and 
how these concepts were related to each other. The concept-elaboration task con-
sisted of three central concepts (i.e., strict liability, damages, tort/unlawful act), one 
abstract concept (protective norm), and one intermediate concept (owner), selected 
from the concepts in the card-sorting task. Participants received the five concepts 
one by one in random order and were instructed to verbalize everything they knew 
about that specific concept, in a fixed time of two minutes per concept. It was hy-
pothesized that 1) as expertise increases, knowledge would be more hierarchically 
structured and would show more overlap with individuals of the same level of 
expertise, 2) more central concepts would be provided in the card sorting task as 
expertise increases, 3) novices would order concepts randomly (without any struc-
ture) more often than advanced students and experts, 4) concept elaborations would 
be more accurate as expertise increases (which implies a higher degree of overlap-
ping knowledge and agreed upon explicit representations, i.e., ontology), and 5) 
novices would give more daily examples in their elaborations than advanced stu-
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dents and experts. Results on the concept elaboration task showed that novices 
indeed used more everyday language and were less accurate in their elaborations of 
concepts than advanced students and experts, and results on the card-sorting task 
showed that the organisation of their knowledge was very diverse within their 
group (i.e., lack of ontology). The organization of advanced students’ knowledge 
partially overlapped within their group, but parts of their knowledge were still 
diverse. The organization of experts’ knowledge, on the other hand, was strongly 
overlapping within their group (i.e., strong ontology) and was structured along 
different fields of law. Also in line with our hypothesis, experts mentioned more 
central concepts than both novices and advanced students by the card sorting task. 
Furthermore, they were more accurate than novices and advanced students in their 
elaborations of the five different concepts during the concept elaboration task. 
 Chapter 3 describes a study in which again 24 first-year (novices) and 24 third-
year (advanced) student and 12 staff members specialized in private law (experts), 
participated. This study, investigated the role of conceptual knowledge in solving 
legal cases. First, a situation was studied in which no information sources could be 
used while reasoning about a case. It was predicted that: 1) students -novice and 
advanced- would be less accurate in solving a legal case than experts, and 2) that 
there would be differences in the problem-solving process because students have 
less conceptual knowledge than experts. This involved half of the first-year stu-
dents, half of the third-year students, and all staff members. They were instructed to 
solve a case without the use of external information sources that would normally be 
at their disposal (in this case, the Dutch civil code), and to think aloud while doing 
so. Under these circumstances, first-year, and third-year students’ performance was 
significantly lower than that of experts as expected, but even experts’ performance 
was rather low. These findings suggested that experts not only relied on the code 
for substantiating conclusions, but also for working towards conclusions. Contrary 
to our expectations, no differences between experts on the one side and first-year 
and third-year students on the other side were found with regard to problem-
solving processes. The fact that experts and students did not differ with regard to 
their problem solving process, might be a consequence of not being allowed to use 
information sources which may have interfered with their usual approach to prob-
lem solving. Second, it was studied whether first-year students and third-year stu-
dents would actually benefit from the availability of the civil code when they have 
to solve a legal case, and it was hypothesized that this might not be the case for 
novices, because their lack of conceptual knowledge would also affect the use of the 
civil code. Performance of twelve fist-year students and twelve third-year student 
who were allowed to use the civil code when solving the case while thinking aloud 
was compared to the performance of the previously mentioned twelve first-year 
and twelve third-year students who were not allowed to use the civil code when 
solving the case. In line with our expectation, it was found that having the civil code 
available did not improve first-year students’ performance, while third-year stu-
dents did better with the code. Not being able to profit from the availability of the 
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code is very likely a consequence of novices’ lack of conceptual knowledge, lack of 
knowledge of how this information source is organized, or both. 
 Chapter 4 describes two experiments that investigated the effects of two differ-
ent types of hypothesized support for learning to reason about cases. In the first 
experiment, seventy-nine first-year (novice) law students participated, and the ef-
fects of two types of instructional support on performance were investigated in a 2 x 
2 factorial design: a) support for their lack of conceptual knowledge by providing 
them the meaning of the important case concepts along the case, which would help 
students to make more sense of the information in the case, and b) reducing their 
search process in the external source by providing a condensed (relevant articles 
only) rather than a complete civil code, which would reduce the high load imposed 
by the search process that is ineffective for learning to solve the case. Students were 
randomly assigned to one of the four conditions. They first completed a pre-test in 
which they had to provide the definitions of 20 relevant concepts, then studied two 
learning cases with the kind of support depending on the assigned condition, then 
solved a test case with no support provided (but they could use the standard com-
plete civil code), and finally completed the conceptual knowledge test (cf. pre-test) 
again. It was found that test case performance, was significantly improved by use of 
the condensed civil code, but not by providing students concept explanations. This 
finding suggests that the ineffective load imposed by the search process is the most 
likely explanation for the difficulties novice students experience when learning to 
reason about cases. Although it did not affect reasoning, providing students with 
concept explanations along the case, was useful: it led to better reproduction of the 
formal meaning of those concepts after the learning phase compared to students 
who had not received the explanations. Presumably, this was not sufficient to foster 
reasoning because the meaning of each single concept was given without any fur-
ther information about the relationship(s) with other concepts and its implication(s) 
in this specific context. In all conditions, however, there was still a lot of room for 
improvement on test case performance. The second experiment investigated sup-
port for the entire reasoning process. 
 In this experiment, 75 first-year students and 36 third-year students partici-
pated, and the effects of two different types of support were investigated for stu-
dents at different levels of expertise (i.e., a 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design): a) process-steps 
provided students with a set of generic steps to guide their reasoning about the 
case, b) worked-examples provided students with a worked-out ideal solution of 
the cases -initial problem formulation, goal state, and solution steps- to study. With-
in each expertise level, students were randomly assigned to one of the four condi-
tions. After completing the pre-test (the same as in experiment 1), they studied two 
learning cases (the same as in experiment 1) with the kind of support depending on 
the assigned condition, and then solved a test case (the same as in experiment 1) 
with no support provided (but they could use the standard complete civil code). It 
was predicted that a) novices would learn most if they were supported with worked 
examples (either with or without process-steps being made explicit as well) because 
they lack the necessary knowledge to solve cases, whereas, b) advanced students 
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might either also benefit from worked examples, or if the findings concerning the 
expertise reversal effect (found in highly structured domains; Kalyuga, Ayres, 
Chandler, & Sweller, 2003) apply also in more complex domains, then the process-
steps, which provide more generic guidance, might be the best form of support for 
advanced students. The results showed that test performance improved signifi-
cantly after studying worked examples during the learning phase, for both first-year 
and third-year students. Providing students with the process-steps to be taken, did 
not improve their learning, on the contrary: it had disadvantageous effects on per-
formance of both groups of students when only the steps were given (i.e., not com-
bined with an example). A possible explanation is that the process-steps interfere 
with learning because students try to use them, but are not able to do so effectively 
because they need to find out for themselves what they have to do at those steps 
and why. 
 The addendum to Chapter 4 described a field study in which a Faculty of Law 
implemented worked examples in a four-week first-year course on property law. 
The students had to study worked examples before the weekly tutorial. During the 
tutorial the teacher discussed the learned example with the students. Comparing the 
examination scores with the foregoing year in which worked-examples were not 
used, showed positive results (more students passed). Of course, these results have 
to be interpreted with care, as it cannot be ruled out based on the available data that 
this cohort was not in other ways different from the previous year, but nonetheless, 
it seems that worked examples are an effective way of enhancing learning when 
applied in law curricula. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the main findings in terms of theoretical and practi-
cal implications, as well as suggestions for future research. 
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Samenvatting 
  
Het belangrijkste doel van het juridisch onderwijs in zowel het continentaal Euro-
pese als in het Angelsaksische rechtssysteem, is dat studenten leren redeneren over 
juridische problemen, ook wel casus genaamd. Zoals in Hoofdstuk 1 wordt 
beschreven, hebben rechtenstudenten aanzienlijke moeite met het leren redeneren 
over juridische casus. De moeilijkheden die studenten ervaren, lijken gerelateerd 
aan de complexiteit van het domein, aan de wijze waarop kennis verworven wordt 
in complexe domeinen, alsmede aan de wijze waarop het juridisch onderwijs wordt 
vormgegeven. Meestal is leren redeneren over casus gebaseerd op het principe 
‘leren door te doen’, wat betekent dat studenten moeten redeneren over heel veel 
casus gedurende hun opleiding, gebruik makend van externe bronnen zoals wet-
boeken en naslagwerken over jurisprudentie die normaliter ook in de juridische 
praktijk worden geraadpleegd. De studies die worden beschreven in de hoofdstuk-
ken 2 tot en met 4 zijn opgezet om meer inzicht te krijgen in de aard van de 
moeilijkheden -en de onderliggende oorzaak daarvan- die studenten met verschil-
lende expertiseniveaus ervaren wanneer zij leren redeneren over casus. Voorts 
wordt onderzocht aan welke eisen een effectieve onderwijsmethode zou moeten 
voldoen die erop gericht is de moeilijkheden die studenten nu ervaren te ver-
minderen of weg te nemen door hen meer ondersteuning te bieden tijdens hun leer-
proces. 
 Hoofdstuk 2 beschrijft een studie waarin conceptuele kennis en ontologische 
kennis van 24 eerstejaarsstudenten (novieten), 24 derdejaarsstudenten (gevorder-
den), en 12 docenten van verschillende Nederlandse universiteiten gespecialiseerd 
in het privaatrecht (experts), werd onderzocht middels een kaartsorteertaak en een 
conceptuitlegtaak. De kaartsorteertaak bestond uit 30 verschillende concepten, af-
gedrukt op aparte kaartjes, die allemaal in meerdere of mindere mate gerelateerd 
waren aan een centraal concept binnen het privaatrecht: ‘onrechtmatige daad’. 
Deelnemers kregen de opdracht om de 30 concepten te groeperen zodat concepten 
ondergebracht in één bepaalde groep een sterkere relatie met elkaar hadden dan 
met concepten die in andere groepen werden ondergebracht. Tijdens deze taak 
moesten deelnemers hardop denkend beargumenteren waarom zij specifieke con-
cepten met elkaar in verband brachten. De conceptuitlegtaak bestond uit een selec-
tie van concepten uit de kaartsorteertaak: drie centrale concepten: (d.w.z., risico-
aansprakelijkheid, schadevergoeding, onrechtmatige daad), een abstract concept 
(d.w.z., relativiteitsbeginsel), en een contextgebonden concept (d.w.z., eigenaar). De 
deelnemers ontvingen de vijf concepten achtereenvolgens in een willekeurige volg-
orde. Zij kregen de instructie om alles dat zij wisten over het specifieke concept 
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hardop denkend uit te spreken gedurende twee minuten. De volgende hypothesen 
werden gesteld: 1) naarmate expertise toeneemt zal kennis meer hiërarchisch 
gestructureerd worden en zal er meer overlap in kennis zijn tussen deelnemers met 
een overeenkomstig expertiseniveau, 2) naarmate expertise toeneemt zullen deel-
nemers meer centrale concepten benoemen tijdens de structurering van de kaart-
sorteertaak, 3) novieten zullen, vaker dan gevorderde studenten en experts, concep-
ten geheel willekeurig -zonder enkele structuur- ordenen, 4) naarmate expertise 
toeneemt zal de conceptuitleg meer accuraat zijn. Dit impliceert een hogere mate 
van overlappende kennis en het hebben van gemeenschappelijke expliciete externe 
representaties, d.w.z. ontologie, en 5) novieten zullen, vaker dan gevorderde stu-
denten en experts, meer alledaagse voorbeelden geven bij de conceptuitlegtaak. 
Zoals verwacht lieten de resultaten van de conceptuitlegtaak zien dat novieten meer 
alledaags taalgebruik hanteerden en minder accuraat waren in hun conceptuitleg 
dan gevorderde studenten en experts. Daarnaast ondersteunden de resultaten van 
de kaartsorteertaak de assumptie dat de kennisorganisatie van novieten binnen hun 
eigen groep zeer divers was (d.w.z., geen ontologie). De kennisorganisatie van 
gevorderde studenten overlapte gedeeltelijk -met name met betrekking tot de oor-
zaken en consequenties van de onrechtmatige daad- binnen hun groep, echter, an-
dere gedeelten van hun kennis overlapten niet. De kennisorganisatie van experts 
onderling, daarentegen, overlapte zeer sterk (d.w.z., sterke ontologie) en was 
gestructureerd aan de hand van verschillende rechtsgebieden. Overeenkomstig 
onze verwachting baseerden experts hun structurering bij de kaartsorteertaak vaker 
op centrale concepten dan novieten en gevorderde studenten. Ook waren experts 
meer accuraat dan novieten en gevorderde studenten in hun uitleg van concepten 
tijdens de conceptuitlegtaak. 
 In hoofdstuk 3 wordt een studie beschreven waarin wederom 24 eerstejaarsstu-
denten (novieten), 24 derdejaarsstudenten (gevorderden) en 12 docenten (experts) 
gespecialiseerd in het privaatrecht, deelnamen. In deze studie werd de rol van con-
ceptuele kennis bij het oplossen van casus nader onderzocht. Allereerst werd de rol 
van conceptuele kennis onderzocht in een situatie waarbij geen externe infor-
matiebronnen mochten worden geraadpleegd tijdens het redeneren. Er werd voor-
speld dat: 1) studenten -novieten en gevorderden- in deze situatie minder accuraat 
zullen zijn in het oplossen van een casus dan experts, en 2) er verschillen zullen zijn 
tussen studenten en experts wat betreft het probleemoplossingproces omdat stu-
denten minder conceptuele kennis hebben dan experts. Aan deze situatie namen de 
helft van de eerstejaarsstudenten, de helft van de derdejaarsstudenten en alle docen-
ten, deel. Deelnemers werden geïnstrueerd hardop denkend een casus op te lossen 
zonder dat zij gebruik mochten maken van een externe bron waarvan zij normaliter 
wel gebruik zouden mogen maken (in dit geval het burgerlijk wetboek). Onder deze 
omstandigheden was zoals verwacht de prestatie van eerstejaarsstudenten en der-
dejaarsstudenten significant lager dan de prestatie van experts. Echter, de prestatie 
van experts was ook opvallend laag. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat experts niet 
alleen afhankelijk zijn van het burgerlijk wetboek wanneer zij conclusies onder-
bouwen, maar ook voor hun gehele argumentatie voorafgaand aan de conclusie. In 
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tegenstelling tot onze verwachtingen werden er geen verschillen gevonden in 
probleemoplossingprocessen tussen experts enerzijds en novieten en gevorderden 
anderzijds. Dat experts en studenten niet verschillen ten aanzien van probleem-
oplossingprocessen kan een consequentie zijn van het feit dat zij geen gebruik 
mochten maken van externe bronnen, hierdoor is hun gebruikelijke probleemaan-
pak mogelijk verstoord. Ten tweede werd middels deze studie onderzocht of eerste-
jaarsstudenten en derdejaarsstudenten daadwerkelijk kunnen profiteren van de 
mogelijkheid gebruik te mogen maken van het burgerlijk wetboek tijdens het op-
lossen van een casus. De veronderstelling was dat alleen de novieten geen voordeel 
zouden hebben van het mogen gebruiken van het wetboek omdat hun conceptuele 
kennis ontoereikend is en dit waarschijnlijk ook van invloed is op het gebruik van 
het wetboek. Om dit te onderzoeken werden de prestaties van 12 eerstejaarsstuden-
ten en 12 derdejaarsstudenten die wel gebruik mochten maken van het burgerlijk 
wetboek tijdens het oplossen van een casus -terwijl zij wederom hardop dachten- 
vergeleken met de prestaties van de bovengenoemde 12 eerstejaars en 12 derde-
jaarsstudenten die geen gebruik mochten maken van het wetboek tijdens het op-
lossen van de casus. Zoals verwacht, werd gevonden dat de beschikbaarheid van 
een wetboek geen effect had op de prestatie van eerstejaarsstudenten, terwijl derde-
jaarsstudenten juist beter presteerden wanneer zij het wetboek tot hun beschikking 
hadden. De bevinding dat novieten geen profijt hadden van de mogelijkheid het 
wetboek te gebruiken is hoogst waarschijnlijk een consequentie van hun gebrek aan 
conceptuele kennis, hun gebrek aan kennis over de manier waarop de inhoud van 
het wetboek is gestructureerd, of beide. 
 In hoofdstuk 4 worden twee experimenten beschreven waarin het effect van 
twee verschillende vormen van veronderstelde ondersteuning voor het leren 
redeneren over casus werden onderzocht. Aan het eerste experiment namen 79 
eerstejaarsstudenten (novieten) deel en werd het effect van twee vormen van onder-
steuning onderzocht middels een 2 bij 2 factorieel design: a) ondersteuning voor 
hun gebrek aan conceptuele kennis door de betekenis van belangrijke concepten uit de 
casus naast de casus te presenteren, wat hen mogelijk in staat stelt de casusinfor-
matie beter te begrijpen, en, b) het reduceren van hun zoekproces in een externe 
bron door hen in plaats van het gehele burgerlijk wetboek een gecondenseerde versie 
hiervan te geven die alleen de artikelen bevat die noodzakelijk zijn voor het op-
lossen van de casus. De gecondenseerde versie zou de cognitieve belasting die ver-
moedelijk wordt veroorzaakt door het zoekproces in het volledige wetboek -en als 
gevolg daarvan het leren belemmert- kunnen verlagen. Studenten werden 
willekeurig in één van de vier condities ingedeeld. Zij startten met het invullen van 
een kennistoets waarin zij de definitie moesten geven van 20 relevante concepten. 
Vervolgens bestudeerden zij twee leercasus al dan niet met behulp van extra onder-
steuning afhankelijk van de conditie waarin zij ingedeeld waren. Daarna losten zij 
een testcasus op waarbij geen ondersteuning meer werd geboden. Hierbij mocht 
iedereen echter gebruik maken van het volledige wetboek. Tot slot vulden studen-
ten de kennistoets nogmaals in. De resultaten lieten zien dat de prestatie op een 
testcasus significant verbeterde wanneer studenten waren ondersteund met de ge-
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condenseerde versie van het wetboek, maar niet wanneer studenten conceptuitleg 
kregen aangeboden. Deze bevinding suggereert dat de ineffectieve belasting vero-
orzaakt door het zoekproces in het volledige wetboek de meest voor de hand lig-
gende verklaring is voor de moeilijkheden die novieten ervaren wanneer zij leren 
redeneren over casus. Ondanks het feit dat het geen effect op redeneren had, bleek 
het aanbieden van conceptuitleg naast de casus zinvol: in vergelijking tot studenten 
die geen conceptuitleg ter ondersteuning hebben gekregen, waren studenten die dat 
wél kregen beter in staat om na de leerfase de formele betekenis van concepten te 
reproduceren. Waarschijnlijk is het aanbieden van conceptuitleg niet voldoende om 
het redeneren te bevorderen, omdat de betekenis van de concepten werd gegeven 
zonder aanvullende informatie over de relaties met andere concepten en de implica-
ties in de specifieke context. In alle condities was er echter nog veel ruimte voor 
verbetering in de prestatie op de testcasus. Het tweede experiment onderzocht 
vormen van ondersteuning voor het gehele redeneerproces. 
 Aan dit experiment namen 75 eerstejaarsstudenten en 36 derdejaarsstudenten 
deel. Hierin werd het effect van twee verschillende vormen van ondersteuning on-
derzocht binnen de twee expertiseniveaus door middel van een 2 bij 2 bij 2 factorieel 
design: a) processtappen die studenten ondersteunen met een aantal generieke stap-
pen dat het redeneerproces leidt, b) uitgewerkte voorbeelden ondersteunen studenten 
met een uitgewerkte modeloplossing van een casus die ze moeten bestuderen. Bin-
nen ieder expertiseniveau werden studenten willekeurig ingedeeld in één van de 
vier condities. Na het invullen van de kennistoets bestudeerden studenten twee 
leercasus al dan niet met ondersteuning afhankelijk van hun conditie en losten, tot 
slot, de testcasus op zonder hierbij ondersteuning te ontvangen waarbij iedereen 
echter gebruik mocht maken van het volledige wetboek (alles overeenkomstig ex-
periment 1). Voorspeld werd: a) novieten het meeste leren wanneer zij ondersteund 
worden door uitgewerkte voorbeelden (ongeacht of daarbij processtappen expliciet 
werden aangegeven), omdat zij niet de nodige kennis hebben om casus op te kun-
nen lossen, terwijl, b1) gevorderde studenten, net als novieten, voordeel zouden 
kunnen hebben van het bestuderen van uitgewerkte voorbeelden, of, b2) -indien er 
ook een ‘expertise reversal effect’ optreedt (dat vaak gevonden wordt in minder 
complexe domeinen; Kalyuga, Ayres, Chandler, & Sweller, 2003) in complexere 
domeinen zoals het rechtsdomein- gevorderde studenten voordeel zouden hebben 
van processtappen die meer generieke sturing bieden. De resultaten op de test lieten 
zien dat de prestatie significant verbetert nadat zowel eerstejaars als derdejaarsstu-
denten uitgewerkte voorbeelden hebben bestudeerd. Wanneer studenten werden 
ondersteund met processtappen werd leren niet bevorderd. Integendeel, het had 
een ongunstig effect op de prestatie voor beide groepen studenten wanneer alleen 
de stappen werden gegeven, d.w.z., niet in combinatie met een uitgewerkt voor-
beeld. Een mogelijke verklaring is dat processtappen interfereren met het leren, 
omdat studenten de stappen proberen toe te passen, maar niet in staat zijn dat effec-
tief te doen, omdat zij zelf moeten achterhalen welke informatie relevant is voor de 
stappen en hoe de stappen toegepast dienen te worden. 
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 In het addendum bij Hoofdstuk 4 wordt tenslotte een veldstudie beschreven 
naar de implementatie van uitgewerkte voorbeelden bij een rechtenfaculteit in een 
vier weken durend onderwijsblok over eigendomsrecht voor eerstejaarsstudenten. 
Studenten moesten iedere week voor het begin van het werkcollege een uitgewerkt 
voorbeeld van een situatie met betrekking tot eigendomsrecht bestuderen. Tijdens 
het werkcollege bediscussieerde de docent het bestudeerde voorbeeld met de stu-
denten. De tentamenresultaten waren positief (d.w.z., meer studenten slaagden) ten 
opzichte van de tentamenresultaten van het voorafgaande jaar waarin studenten 
niet middels uitgewerkte voorbeelden hadden geoefend. Deze bevindingen dienen 
natuurlijk voorzichtig geïnterpreteerd te worden. Op basis van de beschikbare data 
kan immers niet worden uitgesloten dat dit cohort studenten niet op andere aspec-
ten verschilt van dat van het voorgaande jaar. Het lijkt er echter op dat het bestu-
een in een experimentele setting, maar 
ook wanneer het wordt toegepast in een juridisch curriculum, het leren bevordert. 
 Tot slot worden in Hoofdstuk 5 de belangrijkste bevindingen bediscussieerd in 
termen van theoretische en praktische implicaties, gevolgd door suggesties voor 
toekomstig onderzoek. 
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